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I. INTRODUCTION 
Alice is a residential tenant living in a low-income neighborhood 
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.1 Like most low-income tenants, Alice did 
not sign a written lease, and she rents month-to-month. Although 
Alice’s apartment is in relatively good repair, the heater does not 
work, and several of the windows are broken. The unit is drafty, and 
her infant son is often sick. After making several unsuccessful 
complaints to her landlord, Alice contacted the city agency 
responsible for code enforcement to report her apartment’s condition. 
Within days of making her complaint, Alice’s landlord served her 
with a five-day notice of eviction designed to send a message to her 
and the other tenants that complaining to the local authorities has 
consequences. 
Nearly 4,000 miles away in Crosby, Liverpool, Debbie faces a 
similar fate.2 Debbie lives alone in a rented flat and suffers from 
                                                                                                             
 1. This hypothetical is adapted from a case study reported in the empirical 
and observational work of Matthew A. Desmond in Eviction and the Reproduction 
of Urban Poverty, 118 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 88 (2012). 
 2. This hypothetical is adapted from a report of the Citizens Advice Bureau 
on retaliatory eviction in the United Kingdom. DEBBIE CREW, THE TENANT’S 
DILEMMA, WARNING: YOUR HOME IS AT RISK IF YOU DARE COMPLAIN, CITIZENS 
2015] ELIMINATING LANDLORD RETALIATION 1073 
 
 
 
Crohn’s disease. The windows in her flat do not close, and the 
house is often damp. The sole heater—a small electric fireplace—
does not heat the dwelling sufficiently and is very expensive to 
run. After Debbie’s landlord refused to pay for a new heating unit, 
she sought help from a local charity, which was in turn able to 
secure a grant for central gas heating to be installed on the 
property. However, the landlord declined the grant when 
contractors advised that he would need to pay £800 to have the 
meter relocated to comply with local housing regulations. The 
charity advised Debbie that although she had the right to take 
action to require her landlord to comply with the law, she risked 
provoking retaliation by her landlord in the form of an eviction. 
Debbie decided to do nothing rather than jeopardize her housing.  
Although Alice and Debbie face similar challenges, Alice’s 
circumstances may be somewhat less grim. Wisconsin law 
expressly forbids “retaliatory eviction” in response to a tenant’s 
complaint to a local housing code enforcement agency or to the 
landlord about the condition of the premises.3 In fact, municipal 
law not only prohibits this conduct, but it also presumes that any 
attempt by a landlord to terminate a tenancy within 12 months after 
a complaint to the housing authority is retaliatory.4 Under state and 
local law, Alice has a valid defense to her landlord’s suit for 
eviction. Provided she pays her rent on time, Alice can be assured 
that her tenure is secure for at least the next year. Currently in 
England, however, no such prohibition on landlord retaliation is 
recognized. Landlords are entitled to evict tenants renting under 
periodic tenancies for any reason simply by serving proper notice.5 
                                                                                                             
 
ADVICE BUREAU 3 (2007), available at http://https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk 
/tenants_dilema_-_document.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/A72G-SM7M.  
 3. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 704.45 (Westlaw 2015); WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP § 
134.09(5) (Westlaw 2015); MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 200-21-8 
(2009).  
 4. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 200-21-8 (2009) (“It shall 
be presumed that any attempt to terminate the tenancy, or to increase charges, or 
to reduce services or to refuse to renew a rental agreement, or to otherwise 
harass or retaliate against such occupant or to reduce the level of services being 
rendered to such occupant during the period from the first complaint to the 
commissioner to 12 months after complete reimbursement to the city for the 
costs incurred by it in acting under this section is done in retaliation and is void 
and subject to a forfeiture of not less than $100 nor more than $2,000 for each 
such attempt.”). 
 5. Housing Act, 1988, c. 2, § 21(1)(b) (Eng.). See also infra Part II.A. 
Unlike a tenancy for a fixed term, a periodic tenancy continues indefinitely, 
usually on a month-to-month basis.  
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Thus, Debbie risks losing her home if she makes a complaint to the 
local authority, no matter how legitimate it may be.  
Retaliatory eviction has been the subject of much recent public 
debate in the United Kingdom.6 Tenant advocates in England and 
Wales claim that landlord retaliation is widespread—even 
rampant—with over 300,000 tenants experiencing some form of 
landlord retaliation each year.7 Fear of landlord retribution, it is 
argued, stymies complaints about housing conditions and in turn 
leads to hazards and blight.8 Over half of the private tenant 
population in England alone endures damp conditions, mold, 
leaking windows and roofs, electrical hazards, animal infestations, 
and gas leaks, and as many as one in eight dare not speak up for 
fear of a landlord’s revenge.9  
In July 2014, public concern about landlord retaliation came to 
a head when landmark legislation aimed at preventing retaliatory 
eviction was introduced in England’s House of Commons.10 In 
substance, the proposed law is simple—it would prevent a landlord 
from serving an otherwise valid notice to vacate on a tenant who 
made legitimate complaints about the property’s condition.11 
However, despite initial support from the Government, the bill 
floundered under the pressure of landlord advocates who maintain 
that this legislation is both unnecessary and rife with the potential 
for tenant abuse.12 Although tenant advocates narrowly succeeded 
in resuscitating the nearly failed bill by appending an amendment 
to a widely supported deregulation bill,13 the anti-retaliation law 
                                                                                                             
 6. This paper focuses on landlord retaliation in England and Wales. 
Although neither Scotland nor Northern Ireland is addressed herein, the moniker 
“United Kingdom” is used throughout as a convenient shorthand reference. 
 7. HANNAH GOUSY, SHELTER, SAFE AND DECENT HOMES: SOLUTIONS FOR A 
BETTER PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR 7 (2014), available at http://England.shelter.org 
.uk/_data/assets/pdf_file/0003/1039530/FINAL_SAFE_AND_DECENT_HOMES_
REPORT-_USE_FOR_LAUNCH.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BYX6-QD SG. 
Shelter estimates that each year 3% of tenants are served with notice, or threatened 
with eviction because they complain to their local council or their landlord about a 
problem in their home. Id. See also infra Parts II.B, III.B (discussing Shelter’s 
estimates of landlord retaliation and debates regarding their accuracy).  
 8. GOUSY, supra note 7, at 7. See also infra Part II.B. 
 9. GOUSY, supra note 7, at 25. See also infra Part II.B. 
 10. Tenancies (Reform) Bill 2014–15, PARLIAMENT.UK, http://services.parlia 
ment.uk/bills/2014-15/tenanciesreform.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6PXX-
9X24 (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
 11. Tenancies (Reform) Bill, 2014-15, H.C. Bill [19] cl. 1 (Eng.), available at 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2014-2015/0019/15019.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/6NPC-UVB7.  
 12. See infra Parts III.B, III.C. 
 13. Deregulation Bill 2013-14 & 2014-15, H.L. Bill [95] (Eng.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2014-2015/0095/15095.pdf, 
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still has staunch opponents, not only in England but also in Wales, 
where lawmakers have recently introduced anti-retaliation legislation in 
the National Assembly as part of a much-anticipated comprehensive 
housing bill.14  
In their efforts to keep anti-retaliation initiatives in the United 
Kingdom afloat, tenant advocates point to common law jurisdictions 
around the world whose landlord–tenant law prohibits retaliatory 
conduct.15 New South Wales, Australia, New Zealand, and even the 
United States provide for these protections—why then should not 
the United Kingdom?16 Thus far, comparisons to foreign law have 
been limited and cursory, pointing only to the presence or absence 
of anti-retaliation regimes in the law.17 More comprehensive 
examination of retaliatory eviction regimes abroad—both in their 
letter and their application—is lacking. This Article seeks to 
contribute to the legal–political debate surrounding landlord 
retaliation in England and Wales by providing a detailed, 
contextual analysis of retaliatory eviction laws in the United States 
and their success at home.  
Parts II and III of this Article review the ongoing efforts aimed 
toward prohibiting retaliatory eviction in England and Wales, 
highlighting the arguments that have led to a stalemate in the 
progress of law reform in those countries. Part IV then describes in 
detail the legal regimes that govern landlord retaliation in the 
United States. As Part IV demonstrates, U.S. anti-retaliation 
regimes are generally robust, with consensus emerging around 
strong tenant protections. Part V goes on to examine statistical and 
anecdotal evidence of tenant evictions that points away from the 
success of U.S. retaliatory eviction laws. Although this evidence 
seems to weigh against legal reform in the United Kingdom, Part 
VI argues that this is not the case. Instead, Part VI provides context 
for comparisons between the United States and the United 
Kingdom and concludes that existing legal and non-legal 
institutions in the United Kingdom will support anti-retaliation 
regimes in ways not currently possible in this country. 
                                                                                                             
 
archived at http://perma.cc/G8L9-WFXK.  
 14. Renting Homes (Wales) Bill § 213 (2015), available at http://www 
.assembly.wales/laid%20documents/pri-ld10098%20-%20renting%20homes%20 
(wales)%20bill/pri-ld10098-e.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/W4W8-YJU2. 
 15. See infra Parts II–III.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. 
1076 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
II. ANTI-RETALIATION LEGISLATION IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
A. Legal Background  
“Revenge” evictions have historically been regarded as entirely 
lawful in much of the United Kingdom, at least in the private 
sector. The overwhelming majority of private tenants in England 
and Wales rent under contracts known as “assured shorthold 
tenancies,” which provide tenants with very little security of 
tenure.18 Although the landlord cannot regain possession of the 
property within the first six months of the lease unless the tenant 
breaches the agreement, after the six-month period has passed, the 
landlord may regain possession at any time upon giving two 
months’ notice of termination.19 The landlord of an assured 
shorthold tenancy need not establish any fault on the part of the 
tenant as a prerequisite to regaining possession. Instead, the 
landlord is entitled to evict for any reason, provided that the 
statutory requirements for notice are met.20 Because eviction is an 
absolute right for landlords of assured shorthold tenancies, no 
inquiry is required (or even permitted) into a landlord’s motives for 
choosing to terminate a lease. Courts are not afforded any 
discretion in granting possession when notice is properly made.21 
The assured shorthold tenancy was introduced to English law 
in 1988 as part of a package of deregulatory reforms designed to 
increase the size of the private rental sector.22 At that time, the 
private rental sector had fallen into serious decline, with less than 
10% of households in England rented from private landlords.23 In 
reaction, conservative policy-makers took aim at long-standing 
security of tenure and rent control requirements that were 
perceived to discourage private investment in the rental housing 
                                                                                                             
 18. See Melissa T. Lonegrass, A Second Chance for Innovation—Foreign 
Inspiration for the Revised Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 35 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 905, 921 (2013). 
 19. Housing Act, 1988, c. 2, § 21(1)(b) (Eng.). See also ANDREW ARDEN & 
ANDREW DYMOND, MANUAL OF HOUSING LAW 113–14 (9th ed. 2012). If the 
tenancy is fixed, then notice may be given two months prior to the end of the 
fixed term. If notice is not provided, then at the end of the fixed term the lease 
becomes periodic. See Housing Act, 1988, c. 2, § 21(2) (Eng.). Periodic assured 
shorthold tenancies may be terminated by giving notice at least two months prior 
to the date of desired termination, which must be the last day of a period. See id. 
§ 21(4)(a) (Eng.). 
 20. ARDEN & DYMOND, supra note 19, at 113–14.  
 21. Id.  
 22. JAMES DRISCOLL, HOUSING: THE NEW LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
THE HOUSING ACT 2004, at 1–2 (2007). 
 23. Id. 
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market.24 Recent evidence showing that the private market has 
risen consistently since the early 1990s demonstrates that efforts at 
deregulation have proven largely successful.25 Thus, the freedom 
provided to landlords by the assured shorthold tenancy is viewed 
as an essential component to the security of the housing market. 
However, laws permitting landlords to evict tenants with 
impunity are difficult to square with other basic obligations owed 
by residential landlords. The provision of a safe dwelling 
maintained in good repair is a basic requirement of all landlords, 
even under assured shortholds. The obligation to provide decent 
housing arises from two separate statutory regimes in England and 
Wales. First, Section 11 of the 1985 Landlord and Tenant Act 
places a statutory duty on most landlords to carry out repairs to the 
structure and exterior of the dwelling; to basins, sinks, baths, and 
other sanitary installations in the dwelling; and to heating and hot 
water installations.26 Additionally, the 2004 Housing Act ushered 
in a new Housing Health and Safety Rating System, which requires 
landlords to take measures to ensure the safety of their tenants 
from specific “hazards,” defined generally as any risk to health or 
safety to an occupier of a dwelling.27 Tenants concerned about the 
condition of their homes can request an inspection by a local 
housing authority environmental health officer, who can then order 
that the landlord make required repairs to bring the dwelling into 
compliance with the law.28  
 In particular, the 2004 introduction of the Health and Safety 
Rating System was designed to address a growing problem of 
decent housing supply in England. Today, 33% of the private 
rented stock in that country is classified as “non-decent,” meaning 
                                                                                                             
 24. DAVID HUGHES AND STUART LOWE, THE PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR IN A 
NEW CENTURY 5 (2002). 
 25. DEP’T FOR CMTY. & LOCAL GOV’T, ENGLISH HOUSING SURVEY 
HEADLINE REPORT 2012–13, at 8 (2013) [hereinafter ENGLISH HOUSING SURVEY 
2012–13], available at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-housing-
survey-2012-to-2013-headline-report, archived at https://perma.cc/76JN-TNUD. 
The report shows that the proportion of households living in the private rented 
sector in 2013–2014 was 18%. Id. 
 26. Landlord & Tenant Act, 1985, c. 70, § 11–14 (Eng.). Leases of longer 
than seven years are exempted from these requirements. Id. 
 27. Housing Act, 2004, c. 34, § 2(1) (Eng.). The stated purpose of the new 
legislation is to ensure that “[a]ny residential premises should provide a safe and 
healthy environment for any potential occupier or visitor.” THE OFFICE OF THE 
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, HOUSING HEALTH AND SAFETY RATING SYSTEM: 
OPERATING GUIDE 8 (2006), available at http://www.nchh.org/Portals/0/Contents 
/HH%20Standards.UKHHRSoperatingguidance.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5 
TYU-PPGJ. 
 28. Housing Act, 2004, c. 34, §§ 5–7 (Eng.).  
1078 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
that it fails to meet minimum statutory requirements for housing 
conditions, that it is in a state of disrepair, or that it lacks reasonably 
modern facilities.29 Although its proponents view the Housing 
Health and Safety Rating System as an important step toward 
improving the quality of housing stock, skeptics remain concerned 
that it does not go far enough to incentivize landlords to maintain 
their properties in good condition.30 Furthermore, tenant advocates 
assert that the ongoing legality of retaliatory eviction stifles tenant 
complaints regarding the condition of rented dwellings, leading to 
further erosion in the quality of housing.31  
B. The Impetus for Reform 
Indeed, the prevalence of retaliatory eviction has received a 
great deal of public attention in the last decade. Although there are 
no official government statistics maintained on evictions,32 
research conducted in part by Shelter UK, a housing charity with a 
strong presence in England and in Wales,33 concluded that during 
2013–2014 roughly 324,000 private tenants in England were 
evicted, served with notice, or threatened with eviction after asking 
for repairs to be carried out or complaining to a local authority’s 
environmental health department about conditions in their homes.34 
In addition, 1 in 12 of the tenants in Shelter’s survey reported that 
they were too scared of losing their home to report a problem or to 
request improved conditions.35 Shelter’s research directly links 
tenants’ fear of retaliation to the declining condition of housing in 
                                                                                                             
 29. ENGLISH HOUSING SURVEY 2012–13, supra note 25.  
 30. See THE LAW COMM’N, RENTING HOMES: THE FINAL REPORT §§ 1.61, 
8.1–8.17 (2008), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc297 
_Renting_Homes_Final_Report_Vol1.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/76JN-
TNUD. 
 31. See CREW, supra note 2; Jan Luba, Repairs, Where Have All the Claims 
Gone?, 14 LANDLORD & TENANT REV. 2010 1, 3–6 (2010); HANNAH GOUSY, 
SHELTER, CAN’T COMPLAIN: WHY POOR CONDITIONS PREVAIL IN PRIVATE 
RENTED SECTOR HOMES 13 (2014), available at http://www.landlordlawblog 
.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/6430_04_9_Million_Renters_Policy_Report_ 
Proof_6_opt.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/T4YQ-5YYH.  
 32. Private Rented Housing: Evictions: Written Question-212213, 
PARLIAMENT.UK, http://www.parliament.uk/written-questions-answers-statements/ 
written-question/commons/2014-10-28/212213, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
9DRM-SWR7 (last updated Mar. 15, 2015). 
 33. See SHELTER, http://www.shelter.org.uk/, archived at http://perma.cc/DS 
Y2-M9GK (last visited Mar. 10, 2015). 
 34. See GOUSY, supra note 7, at 25.  
 35. Id. 
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the private rented sector.36 According to the organization, 61% of 
English tenants surveyed experienced at least one of the following 
problems in the prior 12 months: mold or damp conditions, leaking 
roofs or windows, electrical hazards, animal infestations, or gas 
leaks.37 In addition, 10% of tenants reported that their health had 
been affected during the last year because their landlord had failed 
to address needed repairs or poor conditions on the property, and 
9% reported that their children’s health had been affected.38  
Shelter has also studied the occurrence of retaliatory eviction in 
Wales, though less systematically. Shelter Cymru, the organization’s 
Welsh division, conducted a survey in 2013 of 29 Environmental 
Health and Tenancy Support Officers, who work closely with 
tenants and landlords to resolve disputes, especially involving 
disrepair.39 Of survey respondents, 100% opined that tenants had 
been dissuaded from using help offered by environmental health and 
tenancy support officers because of fears of jeopardizing their 
tenancy.40 Over half (55%) stated that there is “definitely” a need 
for more security for tenants wishing to exercise their statutory 
rights to repairs.41 Additionally, over one-third (41%) indicated 
                                                                                                             
 36. SHELTER, SHELTER’S RESPONSE TO THE REVIEW OF PROPERTY 
CONDITIONS IN THE PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR 3 (2014), available at http://england 
.shelter.org.uk/professional_resources/policy_and_research/policy_library/policy_
library_folder/response_review_of_property_conditions_in_the_private_rented_ 
sector, archived at http://perma.cc/8NEE-LMGW.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. These findings have been widely publicized in both online and print 
media. See, e.g., True Scale of ‘Revenge Evictions’ Exposed by Shelter 
Investigation, SHELTER MEDIA CTR., http://media.shelter.org.uk/home/press 
_releases/true_scale_of_revenge_evictions_exposed_by_shelter_investigation, 
archived at http://perma.cc/XJ2G-ZB5N (last visited Mar. 10, 2015); Seb Klier, 
Revenge Evictions are a Threat Hanging Over UK Renters that Needs to End, 
CITYMETRIC (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.citymetric.com/horizons/revenge-evic 
tions-are-threat-hanging-over-uk-renters-needs-end-411, archived at http://perma.cc 
/S35V-7EBV; Tracy McVeigh, Outlaw Revenge Evictions by Landlords, Says 
Housing Charity, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.theguardian 
.com/society/2014/oct/25/shelter-ban-revenge-evictions-rogue-landlords-tenants, 
archived at http: //perma.cc/5DHK-F6HF; Tweet by Residential Landlord Ass’n 
News, TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2014, 7:51 AM), https://twitter.com/RLA_News 
/status/52239948700505 2930, archived at https://perma.cc/EFV5-NDY6 (directing 
followers to Residential Landlord Ass’n webpage and discussion of Shelter’s 2012–
13 English Housing Survey). 
 39. SHELTER CYMRU, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: PREVENTING RETALIATORY 
EVICTIONS IN WALES 21 (2013), available at http://www.sheltercymru.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/Making-rights-real.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FF2W-
MJTG. 
 40. Id. at 21–22. 
 41. Id. at 22. 
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that they would support a campaign to protect tenants from 
retaliatory eviction.42  
Shelter is not the only organization to report on the prevalence 
of landlord retaliation in the United Kingdom.43 The Citizens 
Advice Bureau, a public assistance charity with offices throughout 
the United Kingdom,44 produced a report in 2007 urging that 
restrictions should be placed on private landlords’ rights to evict 
tenants who complain about disrepair or health and safety 
violations.45 Citizens Advice cited government statistics included 
in the 2000 Survey of English Housing showing that although 21% 
of private tenants in England were dissatisfied with the way their 
landlords carried out repairs and maintenance on their property, 
only one quarter of those said that they had “tried to enforce their 
right.”46 When asked to provide reasons, those who had not taken 
action reported that they did not want to “cause trouble with their 
landlord” (21%), that they “felt their tenancy would be ended” 
(5%), or that they “didn’t think it was worth the effort” (one 
third).47 Citizens Advice also relied on anecdotal evidence supplied 
by the organization’s employees, noting that “[Citizens Advice 
Bureau employees] from around the country regularly report” 
cases of retaliatory conduct by landlords.48 The report further 
revealed that “[i]n some cases landlords have even used their 
power to evict as a bargaining tool to try to get the tenant to pay for 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id. at 24. 
 43. Other tenants’ rights organizations have done similar research. For 
example, the Tenants’ Voice, an online “tenants community,” found in a survey 
of over 2,000 tenants from their Facebook community that 32% of tenants who 
had been evicted or threatened with eviction were put in that position after 
complaining to their landlord about the condition of their property. Additionally, 
the survey found that 71% of tenants had paid for repairs themselves rather than 
asking their landlord to make them, and 61% were wary of complaining to their 
landlords about poor conditions. Of note, 86% of respondents had never heard of the 
term “retaliatory eviction,” suggesting that the practice is underreported. See A Third 
of Tenants Have Been Evicted or Threatened with Eviction After Complaining to 
Their Landlords, THE TENANTS’ VOICE (Oct. 14, 2003), www.thetenantsvoice 
.co.uk/your_home/a-third-of-tenants-have-been-evicted-or-threatened-with-eviction-
after-complaining-to-their-landlords/, archived at http://perma.cc /V5XA-2HUG. 
Additionally, in a 2012 report on the private rented sector in Wales, the 
organization Consumer Focus Wales identified isolated occurrences of retaliation 
and fear of retaliation reported by private tenants. CONSUMER FOCUS WALES, 
THEIR HOUSE, YOUR HOME: THE PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR IN WALES 39–40 
(2012).  
 44. See Citizens Advice, CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAU, www.citizensadvice 
.org.uk, archived at http://perma.cc/LBX8-7L5A (last visited Mar. 10, 2015).  
 45. CREW, supra note 2, at 4.  
 46. Id. at 4–5.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 6. 
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the work needed.”49 Perhaps the most compelling data produced in 
the report was a survey of local authority officers tasked with 
addressing tenant complaints regarding violations of environmental 
health standards. In a survey of these officers, 48% reported that 
tenants were “often” or “always” deterred from accepting help 
because they were afraid of jeopardizing their tenancy.50  
Both Shelter and Citizens Advice have called for an end to 
retaliatory eviction through legislative reforms.51 In turn, legal 
officials in both England and Wales have also begun to investigate 
the problem of landlord retaliation. However, until very recently, 
most governmental inquiries have not resulted in recommendations 
for the type of legislation proposed by Shelter, Citizens Advice, 
and other tenant support organizations.  
For example, in 2008, the Labour Government commissioned a 
review of the private rental sector by the Centre for Housing Policy 
at the University of York.52 The authors of the resultant report 
critiqued the findings of Shelter and Citizens Advice, noting that both 
organizations maintain policies of advising tenants that exercising 
their rights might result in the landlord issuing a termination notice.53 
Thus, the authors concluded, it is “unsurprising” that local authority 
officers found that tenants showed reluctance to pursue complaints 
against their landlords.54 The authors went on to question the 
accuracy of conclusions drawn from the “opinions” of local 
authority officers, noting that the task of calculating the incidence 
of retaliatory eviction is “complex”:  
It cannot be denied that there will be landlords who evict 
tenants who complain about property condition; at the same 
time, it has to be admitted that there are tenants who will 
claim unfair eviction in the hope that this will improve their 
chance of getting a social housing tenancy.55  
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. at 7.  
 50. Id. at 8. Fifty-four percent of officers reported that this “sometimes” 
occurs, while no respondents stated that this “never” occurs. Id.  
 51. Id. at 13 (“Specifically, where a tenant has recently taken steps to 
enforce their statutory rights on disrepair or health and safety issues, landlords 
should not be able to use Section 21 to evict a tenant inappropriately.”). See 
generally GOUSY, supra note 7. 
 52. See generally JULIE RUGG & DAVID RHODES, CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, 
THE UNIV. OF YORK, THE PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR: IN ITS CONTRIBUTION AND 
POTENTIAL (2008), available at www.york.ac.uk/media/chp/documents/2008/prs 
reviewweb.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EYV3-9FTU.  
 53. Id. at 80.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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The authors ultimately concluded that retaliatory eviction 
would be best addressed not by limiting the landlord’s right to 
evict but by “ensuring that landlords who would take this action 
are removed from the sector.”56 
Also in 2008, the Law Commission considered the possibility 
of prohibiting retaliatory eviction, noting that the issue had 
“attracted a considerable amount of public attention over the last 
year.”57 In its report, the Law Commission concluded that proposals 
to limit a landlord’s right to evict following a tenant making a 
complaint about housing conditions suffered from “significant 
difficulties,” most notably the challenge of proving the landlord’s 
retaliatory motive.58 The Law Commission report also concluded 
that because most tenants do not seriously consider pursuing legal 
proceedings, prohibitions on retaliatory eviction “may be of 
symbolic importance but be of little practical effect.”59 The same 
report expressed concern that anti-retaliation laws could cause 
“considerable disturbance to the private rented sector by introducing 
a measure whose impact would be unpredictable and uncertain.”60 
More recently, in 2013, the Communities and Local Government 
Select Committee of Parliament initiated an inquiry into the private 
rented sector that included consideration of retaliatory eviction.61 
Even after receiving evidence from multiple tenant advocacy 
organizations, the Committee stated it was “not convinced” that a 
legislative approach to retaliatory eviction would be an effective 
solution to the problem. In the opinion of the Committee, “[c]hanging 
the law to limit the issuing of [eviction] notices might be counter-
productive and stunt the market.”62 The Committee surmised instead 
that moving toward a “culture” where longer tenancies are the norm 
would give tenants greater security and more confidence to ask for 
improvements.63 The Committee also suggested that proactive 
enforcement of environmental regulations by local authorities 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. at 113. 
 57. THE LAW COMM’N, HOUSING: ENCOURAGING RESPONSIBLE LETTING 
FINAL REPORT ¶ 6.98 (2008), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk 
/docs/lc312_Housing_Encouraging_Responsible_Letting.pdf, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/2KVJ-KYG9. 
 58. Id. at ¶ 6.99.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. See BRITISH PARLIAMENT, www.parliament.uk/business/committees/com 
mittees-a-z/commons-select/communities-and-local-government-committee/role, 
archived at http://perma.cc/S9B6-QXUK (last visited Mar. 10, 2015). 
 62. CMTYS. & LOCAL GOV’T COMM., THE PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR, 2013-14, 
H.C. 50, ¶ 105 (U.K.), available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314 
/cmselect/cmcomloc/50/50.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YN57-2XV3. 
 63. Id. 
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would also obviate the need for tenants to take the responsibility of 
reporting.64 
Finally, in February 2014, the Government launched its own 
inquiry into housing conditions in the private rented sector. The main 
impetus for this project was “to consider what more can be done and 
how to best tackle bad landlords without negatively impacting on the 
good ones.”65 On the topic of retaliatory eviction, the Government 
called for input on whether restrictions on landlords’ rights to evict 
without cause should be introduced in cases where the property is in 
need of major improvements or repairs, what the appropriate “trigger 
point” for introducing such restrictions should be, and how to prevent 
spurious or vexatious complaints.66 Responses to the review were 
accepted up to March 28, 2014, and the Government intends to 
publish its final report sometime in 2015.67  
C. Proposed Legislation in England—The Tenancies (Reform) Bill 
of 2014–15 
Despite the uncertainty of Parliamentary and Governmental 
support for legislative prohibitions on retaliatory eviction, in July 
2014, Member of Parliament Sarah Teather introduced the 
Tenancies (Reform) Bill of 2014–15, aimed primarily at tackling 
landlord retaliation.68  
                                                                                                             
 64. Id.  
 65. DEP’T FOR CMTY. & LOCAL GOV’T, REVIEW OF PROPERTY CONDITIONS IN 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR, 2014, at 5 (U.K.), available at https://www.gov.uk/govern 
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/283979/Review_of_Property_
Conditions_in_the_Private_Rented_Sector__2_ .pdf, archived at https://perma.cc 
/3QQV-J6UJ. 
 66. Id. at 10.  
 67. Id. at 5; Private Rented Housing: Written Question-218368, 
PARLIAMENT.UK, www.parliament.uk/written-questions-answers-statements 
/written-question/commons/2014-12-11/218368, archived at http://perma.cc 
/5X73-6DQE (last visited Mar. 10, 2015). See also WENDY WILSON, 
SOCIAL POLICY SECTION, RETALIATORY EVICTION IN THE PRIVATE RENTED 
SECTOR, 2015, at 9 (U.K.) [hereinafter RETALIATORY EVICTION IN THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR], available at www.parliament.uk/Templates/Briefing 
Papers/Pages/BPPdfDownload.aspx?bp-id=SN 07015, archived at https: 
//perma.cc/VYY9-URXP (containing information on the Tenancies 
(Reform) Bill “provided to Members of Parliament in support of their 
parliamentary duties”).  
 68. Tenancies (Reform) Bill 2014–15, supra note 10. The stated policy 
rationale of the bill is “to prevent tenants from feeling unable to complain about 
poor property conditions because they fear eviction.” See Explanatory Notes to the 
Tenancies (Reform) Bill, 2014-15, H.C. Bill [19] cl. 1 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2014-2015/0019/en/15019en 
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V5DG-SFT4. In addition to addressing the issue 
of retaliatory eviction, the Bill seeks to make changes to the eviction notice 
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The primary thrust of the bill was to prevent a landlord from 
serving an otherwise valid notice of eviction in response to tenant 
complaints about the condition of the dwelling. The bill sought to 
prevent unlawful eviction in assured shorthold tenancies by 
rendering “invalid” a notice of eviction made within six months 
after a local housing authority served a “relevant notice” of needed 
improvements or repairs on the landlord.69 Notably, the bill 
contained a number of exceptions under which the prohibitions on 
evictions would not apply. For example, the law would not apply 
where the complained-of condition was caused by the tenant’s 
failure “to use the dwelling-house in a tenant-like manner,” or by 
the tenant’s breach of an express term in the tenancy agreement.70 
Additionally, the law would not apply if a court determined that 
the tenant’s complaint regarding the condition of the housing was 
“totally without merit.”71 A landlord would also be permitted to 
evict following a tenant’s complaint so long as he placed the 
dwelling house “genuinely on the market for sale.”72 Finally, the 
proposed law would not apply where the dwelling was subject to a 
mortgage granted before the beginning of the tenancy, and the 
mortgagee required possession of the dwelling for the purpose of 
disposing of it with vacant possession.73 No exception was made 
for complaints made by tenants who are in arrears in the payment 
of rent.74 
                                                                                                             
 
procedure “to make the eviction process more straightforward for both landlords 
and tenants.” Id. 
 69. Tenancies (Reform) Bill, 2014-15, H.C. Bill [19] cl. 1(2) (Eng.), available 
at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2014-2015/0019/15019.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8VPL-ZLK9. The term “relevant notice” includes notices 
made in connection with hazard notices and improvement notices made in 
connection with category 1 and category 2 hazards, as well as notices for emergency 
remedial action. Id. § 1(9). 
 70. Id. § 2(1). 
 71. Id. § 2(2). 
 72. Id. § 2(3). The bill makes clear that a dwelling-house is not “genuinely 
on the market for sale” if the landlord intends to sell his interest in the dwelling-
house to a person associated with the landlord or a business partner. Id. § 2(4)–
(6). 
 73. Id. § 2(8)–(9). 
 74. For a comparison of this point to American law, see infra Part VI.A. 
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III. REACTION AND DEBATE 
A. Wavering Support for Reform 
Once introduced, the Tenancies (Reform) Bill attracted broad 
support from local government and tenant representative bodies.75 
Additionally, the Government came out in support of the bill, 
stating that the bill would “root out a minority of spiteful landlords 
and ensure that hardworking tenants are not afraid to ask for better 
standards in their homes.”76  
The Government’s support of the bill was gratifying for tenant 
advocates, given its past stance that legislation prohibiting retaliatory 
eviction might prove deleterious for the housing market.77 However, 
the Government’s support did not provide enough momentum for the 
bill to advance as its proponents had hoped. At its Second Reading, 
which took place on November 28, 2014, the bill did not gain enough 
votes to move forward.78 Commentators initially declared that the bill 
would have “no chance of proceeding” after its failure in November. 
In light of the conflicting views on the extent of retaliatory 
eviction and the appropriate means to address it, the All Party 
Parliamentary Group (APPG) for the Private Rented Sector79 
conducted a short inquiry into retaliatory eviction in late 2014.80 
Written submissions were invited up to November 5, 2014, and the 
APPG’s report, Tackling Retaliatory Eviction, was quickly 
published on December 15. The APPG stated that the volume of 
conflicting statistics submitted in connection with the inquiry was 
“bewildering” and concluded that obtaining objective data on the 
                                                                                                             
 75. See RETALIATORY EVICTION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 67, at 
15. 
 76. Stephen Williams Vows to Outlaw Revenge Evictions, GOV.UK (Sept. 
11, 2014), http://www.gov.uk/government/news/stephen-williams-vows-to-
outlaw-revenge-evictions, archived at http://perma.cc/C7PB-VCPV. 
 77. See Isabel Hardman, Tory Backbenchers Talk Out ‘Revenge Evictions’ Bill, 
THE SPECTATOR (Nov. 28, 2014, 5:51 PM), http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse 
/2014/11/tory-backbenchers-talk-out-revenge-evictions-bill/, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/UF88-4CN2. 
 78. Tenancies (Reform) Bill 2014–15, supra note 10.  
 79. All Party Parliamentary Groups are informal groups of Members of both 
Houses with a common interest in particular issues. APPG reports are therefore 
not official publications of either the House of Commons or the House of Lords, 
or of any of its committees. See ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP FOR THE 
PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR, TACKLING RETALIATORY EVICTIONS—REPORT AND 
ORAL EVIDENCE (2014), available at http://www.rla.org.uk/documents/down 
load.shtml?pid=2735, archived at http://perma.cc/S65R-WWNM. 
 80. RETALIATORY EVICTION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 67, at 7–8 
(citing ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP FOR THE PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR, 
supra note 79). 
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issue proved to be “impossible.”81 In light of this conclusion, the 
APPG cautioned against legislating in the absence of more robust 
evidence of retaliatory eviction and called upon the Government to 
collect this data in the English Housing Survey.82 The group also 
requested the Council of Mortgage Lenders to provide data regarding 
the potential impact of the bill on the buy-to-let market.83  
The APPG additionally recommended other measures that might 
obviate the need for legislation expressly prohibiting retaliatory 
eviction.84 The group recommended that a review of the ability of 
Environmental Health Officers to carry out their enforcement 
responsibilities may be warranted.85 The APPG also recommended a 
new statutory requirement that tenants be given details about their 
rights and responsibilities, especially regarding evictions, prior to 
moving into a property.86 However, no endorsement for the proposed 
bill or any version of it was provided. 
B. Opponents Speak Out 
After its introduction, the Tenancies (Reform) Bill was the 
recipient of staunch criticism—not only of the proposed law, but of 
the evidence proffered by tenant advocates that landlord retaliation 
is a serious problem deserving of legislative attention. The bill’s 
primary opponent was the Residential Landlords Association 
(RLA), which suggested that the problem of retaliatory eviction is 
much more limited than has been suggested by organizations like 
Shelter and Citizens Advice. The RLA also stubbornly maintained 
that existing law contains sufficient protections for the small 
number of tenants who experience retaliation at the hands of a 
“rogue” landlord. The RLA campaigned heavily against the 
Tenancies (Reform) Bill on both of these grounds during the weeks 
leading up to its Second Reading in November 2014.87 
                                                                                                             
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Retaliatory Eviction—Make Sure Your Voice is Heard, RESIDENTIAL 
LANDLORDS ASS’N (Nov. 12, 2014), http://news.rla.org.uk/retaliatory-eviction-make 
-sure-your-voice-is-heard/, archived at http://perma.cc/MYN8-9E5V; Parliament 
Week—Campaign with the RLA on Retaliatory Eviction!, RESIDENTIAL LANDLORDS 
ASS’N (Nov. 14, 2014), http://news.rla.org.uk/parliament-week-campaign-with-the-
rla-on-retaliatory-eviction, archived at http://perma.cc/UVR6-9LFC; Retaliatory 
Eviction Bill Published—Time for Landlords to Act, RESIDENTIAL LANDLORDS 
ASS’N (Nov. 25, 2014), http://news.rla.org.uk/retaliatory-eviction-bill-published-
time-for-landlords-to-act/, archived at http://perma.cc/8EJD-HUVW.  
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First, the RLA disputed Shelter’s estimates of the extent and 
prevalence of retaliatory conduct, emphasizing that the Government 
collects no official statistics on eviction—retaliatory or otherwise—
and that the data proffered by tenant advocates is largely 
anecdotal.88 According to the RLA, “the case [against retaliatory 
eviction] is being based on anecdotal evidence from Environmental 
Health Officers . . . on behalf of local authorities and deductions 
from other statistical evidence, with all the attendant dangers 
which go with such an approach.”89  
The RLA has produced its own evidence that it says counters 
claims that retaliatory eviction is prevalent in the United Kingdom.90 
In a survey of more than 1760 landlords, 56% reported evicting 
tenants.91 Of those, almost 90% cited rent arrears as the reason for 
the eviction.92 Other commonly cited reasons for eviction were anti-
social behavior, damage to property, and drug-related activity.93 
The RLA argues that its survey “demonstrates that the vast 
majority of landlords only seek to evict when they really need 
to.”94 The RLA also cites findings from the 2012–2013 English 
Housing Survey suggesting that 84% of private sector tenants were 
“satisfied” with their accommodations.95 
Additionally, the RLA argues that retaliatory eviction is 
already illegal and that there is therefore no need to legislate 
further in this area.96 The RLA relies in part on the 2008 Unfair 
Trading Regulations, promulgated under the Consumer Protection 
Act, which prohibit conduct that “intimidates or exploits” 
                                                                                                             
 88. See RETALIATORY EVICTION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 67, at 4–5 
(citing Retaliatory Eviction—Case Against Regulatory Intervention, RESIDENTIAL 
LANDLORDS ASS’N (June 21, 2013), http://news.rla.org.uk/retaliatory-evictions-case-
against-regulatory-intervention/, archived at http://perma.cc/FL7B-MPZC (“We 
strongly refute the suggestion that retaliatory eviction is a wide spread practice and 
there is no evidence (properly so called) in support of the campaigners’ claims.”)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Landlords Do Not Evict Tenants Without Reason Shows New Research, 
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORDS ASS’N (Aug. 15, 2014), http://news.rla.org.uk /landlords-
do-not-evict-tenants-without-reason-shows-new-research/, archived at http://perma 
.cc/4CW3-TN28. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See ENGLISH HOUSING SURVEY 2012–13, supra note 25.  
 96. See RETALIATORY EVICTION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 67, at 
15; RESIDENTIAL LANDLORDS ASS’N, RETALIATORY EVICTIONS ALREADY 
ILLEGAL IN PRIVATE RENTED HOUSING 2–3 (2014), available at http://www 
.rla.org.uk/documents/download.shtml?pid=2348, archived at http://perma.cc/4 
YRU-WT3M.  
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consumers.97 The RLA notes that the Official Guidance to the 
Unfair Trading Regulations makes clear that the Regulations apply 
to landlord–tenant relations. According to the Guidance document: 
“[t]hreatening the tenant with eviction to dissuade them from 
exercising rights they have under the tenancy agreement or in law, 
for example where they wish to make a complaint to a local 
authority about the condition of the property, or seek damages for 
disrepair” gives rise to breach of the Unfair Trading Regulations.98 
The RLA acknowledges that tenants cannot bring private actions to 
enforce the Unfair Trading Regulations but advocates that existing 
law be expanded to allow tenants to do so.99  
The RLA further claims that landlord retribution is prohibited 
by existing criminal law. To be sure, the Protection from Eviction 
Act 1977, the Criminal Law Act 1977, and the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 all make harassment and illegal eviction 
criminal offences.100 The RLA explains further that under the 
common law defense of illegality, a court cannot assist a landlord 
in evicting a tenant in retaliation for a complaint about the property 
because the landlord would be committing a criminal offense by 
pursuing such a claim.101 The RLA does not, however, 
acknowledge that the 1997 Harassment Act requires a “course of 
conduct” in order for landlord behavior to rise to the level of a 
criminal offense, making it unlikely that the service of a notice of 
eviction in reaction to a tenant complaint would qualify as such.102 
The RLA also does not acknowledge that under existing criminal 
law, the tenant would be required to affirmatively prove the 
retaliatory conduct of the landlord, whereas proof of retaliatory 
motive is not required under the proposed legislation.103 
Finally, the RLA cautions that the proposed legislation will 
have unintended consequences for landlords and the private rented 
marketplace generally. The RLA argues strongly that any 
limitation on the landlord’s unfettered right to terminate an assured 
shorthold tenancy will erode market confidence “at a time when 
                                                                                                             
 97. RETALIATORY EVICTION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 67, at 15 
(citing Retaliatory Evictions Already Illegal in Private Rented Housing, 
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORDS ASS’N (Nov. 10 2014), http://www.rla.org.uk/documents 
/download.shtml?pid=2348, archived at http://perma.cc/4YRU-WT3M). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 3.  
 100. Id. at 2–3. 
 101. Id. at 3. 
 102. RETALIATORY EVICTION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 67, at 15.  
 103. The RLA also fails to address the fact that criminal cases under these 
statutes are fairly rare, as neither police nor prosecutors are sufficiently 
incentivized or resourced to carry out prosecutions against landlords. See 
Lonegrass, supra note 18, at 955.  
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the private rented sector is the only area of growth in rented 
homes.”104 Legislation invalidating eviction notices following 
requests for repairs will, they say, encourage tenants to request 
repairs or governed inspections in response to any action by 
landlords to tackle rent arrears or other breaches of the tenancy.105 
Thus, the legislation will merely embolden tenants to file false 
claims in an effort to avoid otherwise lawful evictions. The 
Association of Residential Letting Agents, also staunchly opposed 
to the bill, concurs: “It is probable that retaliatory eviction is likely 
to cost landlords more money than merely remedying any 
problem.”106 
C. Covert Legislative Response—The Deregulation Bill  
Although outward support for anti-retaliation law has waned, 
tenant advocates have identified another potential route to success. 
In February, an amendment was proposed with little fanfare to a 
general deregulation bill. The amendment is substantially similar 
to the stalled Tenancies (Act).107 As both houses of Parliament 
have agreed on the text of the Deregulation Bill 2013–14 to 2014–
15, the prohibition of retaliation in England is all but certain.  
As under the prior bill, under the pending law a notice of 
eviction may not be served on a tenant within six months after the 
service of a “relevant notice” of needed repairs or improvements 
on the landlord by the local housing authority.108 The prohibition 
on eviction following a relevant notice does not apply, however, 
where the relevant notice has been revoked as a result of having 
                                                                                                             
 104. RETALIATORY EVICTION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 67, at 16 
(citing Retaliatory Evictions—Case Against Regulatory Intervention, 
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORDS ASS’N (June 21, 2013), http://news.rla.org.uk/re 
taliatory-evictions-case-against-regulatory-intervention/, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/9GU7-U99A). 
 105. Id. 
 106. ASS’N OF RESIDENTIAL LETTING AGENTS, RESPONSE TO THE PRIVATE 
RENTED SECTOR ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP’S INQUIRY ON THE 
TENANCIES (REFORM) BILL 2 (2014), available at http://www.arla.co.uk/media 
/611318/tenancies-reform-bill-prs-appg-inquiry-response-arla.pdf, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/NUF5-ZK2K.  
 107. See Deregulation Bill, 2013-14 & 2014-15, H.L. Bill [95] § 33 (Eng.); see 
also DEP’T FOR CMTYS. & LOCAL GOV’T, POLICY STATEMENT ON AMENDMENT TO 
DEREGULATION BILL (2015), available at https://www.gov .uk/government/uploads 
/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/401602/Policy_statement_on_amendment_to_
Deregulation_Bill.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CF4G-5YY2.  
 108. Deregulation Bill, 2013-14 & 2014-15, H.L. Bill [95] § 33 (Eng.).  
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been served in error, quashed, reversed, or suspended as provided 
by other substantive law.109 
Also as under the prior bill, the pending law contains a number of 
additional exceptions. The law does not apply when the complained-
of condition was caused by the tenant’s failure “to use the dwelling-
house in a tenant-like manner,” or by the tenant’s breach of an 
express term in the tenancy agreement.110 Additionally, a landlord 
may evict following a tenant’s complaint so long as he placed the 
dwelling house “genuinely on the market for sale.”111 Finally, the 
proposed law would not apply where the dwelling was subject to a 
mortgage granted before the beginning of the tenancy and the 
mortgagee required possession of the dwelling for the purpose of 
disposing of it with vacant possession.112  
Notably, the pending law did not incorporate the exception from 
prior law for cases in which a court determines that the tenant’s 
complaint regarding the condition of the dwelling was “totally 
without merit.” 113 Also absent from the pending law is any exception 
for complaints made by tenants who are in arrears in the payment 
of rent. 
D. A Proposal in Wales—The Renting Homes (Wales) Bill 
Tenant advocates have also gained a foothold in the General 
Assembly of Wales. A long-awaited comprehensive housing law 
bill introduced there in February 2015 and set to be reviewed in 
Committee during the summer contains a simple, but potentially 
formidable, retaliatory eviction provision.114  
Unlike the complex and detailed anti-retaliation regime 
introduced in England, the Welsh legislation aims only to provide 
courts with discretion to refuse to award possession to a landlord 
who has acted in a retaliatory manner.115 According to the proposed 
                                                                                                             
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. § 34(1). 
 111. Id. § 34(2). The bill makes clear that a dwelling-house is not “genuinely 
on the market for sale” if the landlord intends to sell his interest in the dwelling-
house to a person associated with the landlord or a business partner. Id. § 34(3). 
 112. Id. § 2(8)–(9). 
 113. Id. § 2(2). 
 114. See Renting Homes (Wales) Bill § 213 (2015), available at http://www 
.assembly.wales/laid%20documents/pri-ld10098%20-%20renting%20homes% 
20(wales)%20bill/pri-ld10098-e.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V84K-557G; 
Landmark Bill to Make it Easier and Simpler to Rent a Home in Wales, 
L L Y W O D R E A T H  C Y M R U  W E L S H  G O V E R N M E N T  ( F e b .  9 ,  2 0 1 5 ) , 
http://gov.wales/newsroom/housing-and-regeneration/2015/renting-homes-
landmark-bill /? lang=en, archived at ht tp://perma.cc/QK7E-UYLG. 
 115. Renting Homes (Wales) Bill § 213(2) (2015). 
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statute, a possession claim is retaliatory if the tenant has relied on or 
invoked the landlord’s obligations to maintain the premises in a 
habitable condition and to make required repairs and the court is 
“satisfied that the landlord has made the possession claim to avoid 
complying with these obligations.”116 As of this writing, the bill has 
been assigned to the Communities, Equality, and Local 
Government Committee, which has issued a call for evidence on 
the bill’s impact.117 Once this inquiry closes, the bill will be 
discussed in Committee for several months before it will be 
debated by the Assembly.118 Although the success of the bill is far 
from certain, the legislation is promising, particularly in light of 
the imminent adoption of anti-retaliation law in England.  
E. Examination of Foreign Experience  
The political discussions surrounding retaliatory eviction, its 
incidence, and the most appropriate means of controlling its 
occurrence have been largely devoid of comparisons to foreign 
common law jurisdictions, where robust anti-retaliation regimes 
are the norm. However, before the debate entered the legislative 
arena, pro-tenant organizations such as Shelter and Citizens 
Advice looked to foreign law for inspiration as to how to 
effectively combat landlord retribution.  
In its 2007 report on retaliatory conduct, Citizens Advice 
observed that in most European jurisdictions, retaliatory eviction is 
not an issue, as private tenants enjoy strong security of tenure 
regimes that permit landlords to evict only in narrowly prescribed 
circumstances, such as rent arrears, damage to property, or, in 
some countries, if the landlord needs the property for use as his 
own dwelling.119 Thus, the best inspiration for a robust anti-
retaliation regime is drawn not from European jurisdictions, but 
from non-European common law jurisdictions where tenants have 
less security of tenure, such as Australia, New Zealand, and the 
                                                                                                             
 116. Id. § 213(3). See also RENTING HOMES (WALES) BILL EXPLANATORY 
MEMORANDUM 33–34 (Feb. 2015), available at http://www.assembly.wales/laid 
%20documents/pri-ld10098-em%20-%20renting%20homes%20(wales)%20bill 
%20-%20explanatory%20memorandum/pri-ld10098-em-e.pdf, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/3BXX-J2DA. 
 117. Consultation, NAT’L ASSEMBLY FOR WALES, http://senedd.assembly 
.wales/mgConsultationDisplay.aspx?ID=168, archived at http://perma.cc/9EQH-
NDFJ (last visited Mar. 27, 2015). 
 118. Renting Homes (Wales) Bill, NAT’L ASSEMBLY FOR WALES, http://senedd 
.assembly.wales/mgIssueHistoryHome.aspx?IId=12055, archived at http://perma 
.cc/H7ZE-9KGZ (last visited Mar. 27, 2015). 
 119. CREW, supra note 2, at 12 & app. 2.  
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United States.120 In all of these countries, landlords can generally 
terminate tenancies without cause, but are prohibited—either by 
legislation or case law—from evicting tenants who have taken 
some action to enforce their rights.121 Shelter has also conducted 
extensive research into the anti-retaliation regimes of common law 
jurisdictions with low security of tenure, including New South 
Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Victoria, Western Australia, 
Tasmania, New Zealand, and the United States.122 
Although Shelter and Citizens Advice urge that a legislative 
solution to landlord retaliation in the United Kingdom ought to 
follow the experience of foreign jurisdictions, thus far foreign law 
has been studied only in its letter, and only facially so. No detailed 
analysis has been undertaken of the great variation—and attendant 
strengths and weaknesses—among state and local laws prohibiting 
landlord retaliation. Moreover, these laws have been studied in their 
appearance only and not in their application. A comprehensive 
review of how well anti-retaliation laws interact with existing legal 
and non-legal institutions for tenant relief must be undertaken and 
should serve as a lens through which to consider how similar anti-
retaliation regimes would function in the United Kingdom. The 
remainder of this Article seeks to fill this gap and contribute to the 
ongoing legislative debate by providing a detailed review of U.S. 
retaliatory eviction laws and their implementation.  
IV. AMERICAN PROHIBITIONS ON LANDLORD RETALIATION 
The vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States prohibit 
landlords from taking revenge against tenants who exercise their 
rights under housing codes or other laws governing tenant rights.123 
Forty states and the District of Columbia have statutes that provide 
varying degrees of protection from retaliatory conduct.124 Another 
four states have recognized the doctrine jurisprudentially.125 Many 
individual municipalities have also enacted anti-retaliation 
                                                                                                             
 120. Id. at 12 app. 1. 
 121. Id. 
 122. SHELTER CYMRU, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: PREVENTING RETALIATORY 
EVICTIONS IN WALES 15–20 & app. (2013), available at http://www.shelter 
cymru.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Making-rights-real.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/FF2W-MJTG. 
 123. See generally Memorandum from Shelly Kurtz & Alice Noble-Allgire to 
Members of the URLTA Drafting Comm. (Oct. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Noble-Allgire 
Memorandum], available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Residential% 
20Landlord%20and%20Tenant/2012oct2_URLTA_Memo_Retaliatory%20Eviction
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4J5A-62EQ.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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ordinances that offer additional protection to local tenants.126 
However, the proliferation of anti-retaliation laws is a relatively new 
phenomenon in American landlord–tenant law. Before exploring 
their variety, some examination of their introduction is warranted.  
A. Early Prohibitions on Retaliation 
As is the case today in the United Kingdom, the American 
common law was entirely unconcerned with an evicting landlord’s 
motive or purpose in terminating the tenancy.127 Landlords enjoyed 
the right to terminate a periodic tenancy or refuse to renew a fixed 
term lease for any reason, simply through timely service upon the 
tenant of a notice to quit.128 Indeed, it was well established that the 
landlord could evict “for any legal reason or no reason at all.”129 
During the second half of the last century, however, American 
courts and legislatures began limiting landlords’ freedom to 
terminate a lease, particularly when eviction served as retribution 
against a tenant for complaining about the condition of a 
residential dwelling.130 
State laws prohibiting retaliatory conduct by landlords were 
first fashioned by the judiciary during the landlord–tenant 
“revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s.131 During that time, housing 
policy shifted dramatically, resulting in new laws that sought to 
ensure safe and habitable housing conditions for residential 
tenants.132 A consequence of this trend was the development by 
courts of rules prohibiting landlords from retaliating against 
tenants for exercising their newly secured rights.133 The doctrine of 
retaliatory eviction was first developed as a defense to the landlord’s 
action for unlawful detainer, on the reasoning that housing and 
sanitary codes and the emerging implied warranty of habitability 
would be rendered ineffective if tenants feared retribution by 
landlords against whom complaints were levied.134  
                                                                                                             
 126. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 5-12-150; see also Lauren A. 
Lindsey, Comment, Protecting the Good-Faith Tenant: Enforcing Retaliatory 
Eviction Laws by Broadening the Residential Tenant’s Options in Summary 
Eviction Courts, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 101, 110 (2010) (listing examples). 
 127. Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant 
Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 540 (1982). 
 128. Id. at 539–40. 
 129. ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 
718 (1980). 
 130. Glendon, supra note 127, at 540. 
 131. 5 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 43.06(a) (2d ed. 2007). 
 132. Glendon, supra note 127, at 521. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 540.  
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In the seminal case of Edwards v. Habib, the D.C. Circuit 
became the first court to articulate the need for such a doctrine.135 
As famously articulated by the opinion’s author, Judge Skelly 
Wright: 
There can be no doubt that the slum dweller, even though this 
home be marred by housing violations, will pause long before 
he complains of them if he fears eviction as a consequence. 
Hence an eviction under the circumstances of this case would 
not only punish appellant for making a complaint which she 
had a constitutional right to make . . . but also would stand as 
a warning to others that they dare not be so bold.136  
Thus, in Edwards, the court held that a landlord could not refuse to 
renew a lease in retaliation for a tenant’s complaint to a housing 
code authority.137 Instead, the tenant was entitled to remain in the 
premises for as long as the landlord’s motive for refusing to renew 
remained retaliatory.138 Following the decision in Edwards, 
numerous other courts employed similar reasoning to recognize the 
anti-retaliation defense.139 
State legislatures followed the lead of the courts by enacting 
retaliatory eviction regimes designed to protect and promote tenants’ 
rights to decent housing.140 These enactments, and the judicial 
decisions applying them, further strengthened tenant protections. 
First, many state statutes expanded protection beyond the prevention 
of eviction.141 Whereas in periodic leases, retaliation tended to take 
the form of termination of the tenancy, other forms of retaliation 
prevailed in fixed term agreements.142 A landlord seeking retribution 
for tenant complaints might instead increase the rent or suspend 
                                                                                                             
 135. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 136. Id. at 701. See also 5 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 43.06(a) (2d ed. 
2007) (“Landlord-tenant reforms are of little utility if a landlord can evict or 
otherwise punish tenants for asserting their rights.”). 
 137. Edwards, 397 F.2d at 701. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Alteri v. Layton, 408 A.2d 18, 20 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979); 
Wilkins v. Tebbetts, 216 So. 2d 477, 478–79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); 
Windward Partners v. Delos Santos, 577 P.2d 326, 331–32 (Haw. 1978); Wright 
v. Brady, 889 P.2d 105, 107–08 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); Clore v. Fredman, 319 
N.E.2d 18, 22 (Ill. 1974); Bldg. Monitoring Sys., Inc. v. Paxton, 905 P.2d 1215, 
1216–17 (Utah 1995); Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Wis. 1970). 
 140. See Glendon, supra note 127, at 542 (“Legislation, rather than judicial 
decisions, predominates in this area.”). 
 141. See generally Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-
Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517 (1984). 
 142. Brian T. McManus, Comment, Retaliatory Evictions in Washington and 
Seattle: In Search of Public Policy, 57 WASH. L. REV. 293, 296 (1982). 
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utility services.143 State legislatures responded by addressing the 
gamut of potentially retaliatory conduct by landlords. Additionally, 
many states sought to prevent landlords from retaliating against 
tenants for reasons other than merely complaining about housing 
conditions. For example, landlords were prohibited from evicting in 
response to tenants’ complaints about a landlord’s criminal conduct 
or opposition to a landlord’s development plans for the property.144 
Over time, some jurisdictions further extended anti-retaliation laws 
to also protect tenants’ First Amendment rights to free speech and 
assembly.145 
B. Uniform Law and the Restatement  
Today, most retaliatory eviction laws in the United States are 
based, at least loosely, on the Uniform Residential Landlord and 
Tenant Act (URLTA), which was published in 1972. The URLTA 
protects three types of tenant behavior: (1) reporting housing code 
violations affecting the tenant’s health or safety; (2) complaining to 
the landlord about the condition or maintenance of the premises; and 
(3) joining or forming a tenant’s union or other tenant’s rights 
advocacy group.146 Tenants who engage in protected behavior are 
afforded a defense in eviction proceedings and may also 
affirmatively claim damages and attorney’s fees in response to a 
landlord’s retaliatory conduct.147 Notably, “retaliatory conduct” by 
landlords may include not only eviction or the threat of eviction but 
also the increasing of rent or the decreasing of services to the 
tenant.148  
Significantly, proscriptions on retaliatory eviction are designed 
solely to avoid wrongful termination of a lease, and not merely 
capricious termination.149 In the absence of a forbidden motive, 
                                                                                                             
 143. Id. 
 144. Rabin, supra note 141, at 534. 
 145. See, e.g., E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 281 A.2d 544 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1971); Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969); McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.9 (1977) 
(discussing views on constitutional violations stemming from retaliation 
eviction). 
 146. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101(a)(1)–(3) 
(1972). 
 147. Id. § 5.101(b). 
 148. Id. § 5.101(a). 
 149. 5 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 43.06(a) (2d ed. 2007) (“The purpose 
of retaliatory conduct statutes is to prohibit retaliatory actions by landlords. 
Accordingly, the statutes do not prohibit particular conduct of the landlord in all 
instances, but only if the conduct has a retaliatory motive behind it.”). 
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landlords remain free to evict a tenant or refuse to renew a lease 
for any reason. Thus, the key component of any retaliatory eviction 
claim is proof of the landlord’s retaliatory motive. Significantly, 
the URLTA provides that if the alleged retaliation occurs within 
one year of the tenant’s protected behavior, a presumption exists in 
the tenant’s favor that the landlord’s conduct was in fact 
retaliatory.150 However, this presumption does not arise if the 
tenant made the complaint after a notice of a proposed rent 
increase or diminution of services.151  
Finally, the URLTA provides that landlords may regain 
possession of the property even after a tenant has taken protected 
action under certain circumstances, described as “safe harbors” for 
the landlord. Thus, the landlord’s conduct will not be deemed 
retaliatory if the tenant caused the damage or code violation of 
which he complains, if the tenant is in default in rent, or if 
compliance with the applicable housing code would require some 
alteration, remodeling, or demolition of the dwelling which would 
effectively deprive the tenant of his use of the dwelling.152 
The Restatement (Second) of Property also recognizes the 
defense of retaliatory eviction, albeit one more limited than that of 
the URLTA. The relevant provision deems “retaliatory” a 
landlord’s termination of a tenancy by notice or failure to renew a 
tenancy for a specified term, provided that five criteria are met.153 
These are: (1) there is a protective housing statute in place; (2) the 
landlord is in the business of renting residential property; (3) the 
tenant is not materially in default in the performance of his 
obligations under the lease at the time the landlord acts; (4) the 
landlord is primarily motivated in acting because the tenant has 
complained about a violation by the landlord of a protective 
housing statute; and (5) the tenant’s complaint was made in good faith 
and with reasonable cause.154 The Restatement’s iteration of the anti-
retaliation doctrine is far more restrictive than that of the URLTA, in 
no small part because it applies only to landlords “in the business” of 
renting and requires affirmative proof of the landlord’s retaliatory 
                                                                                                             
 150. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101(b) (1972). The 
act goes on to say that the term “‘[p]resumption’ means that the trier of fact 
must find the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence is 
introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence.” Id.  
 151. Id. § 5.101(b). 
 152. Id. § 5.101(c). 
 153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.8 (1977). 
 154. Id. 
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motive.155 Although the Restatement approach is not mainstream, 
some state courts have favored its less expansive reach.156 
C. Proliferation—States and Municipalities  
Wide variation exists among state anti-retaliation laws, with 
some states and municipalities offering far less protection to 
tenants than others. The largest disparities exist with respect to five 
components of retaliatory eviction doctrine: (1) its utility as an 
affirmative claim for relief in addition to a defense in a suit for 
eviction; (2) the range of behaviors that are both protected from 
retaliation and that may be deemed retaliatory; (3) the existence 
and strength of a presumption of retaliatory motive on the part of 
the landlord; (4) the scope of relief available to a tenant who 
successfully proves retaliation; and (5) exceptions.  
1. Affirmative and Defensive Claims  
In many jurisdictions where anti-retaliation laws exist, tenants 
may bring an affirmative claim for damages or injunctive relief 
when a landlord has acted in a retaliatory fashion.157 In a minority 
of states, however, a tenant may rely on anti-retaliation law only as 
a defense to a landlord’s action for eviction.158 The latter approach 
severely limits the protective effect of an anti-retaliation regime in 
that it deprives the tenant of any modicum of control over his own 
claim. If a landlord takes steps short of eviction, such as an 
increase in rent, a decrease in services, or even a threat of eviction, 
the tenant has neither access to relief nor leverage in his 
negotiations with the landlord. Rather, the tenant is forced to wait 
until the landlord initiates a legal proceeding before he can 
complain.159 
                                                                                                             
 155. Id. According to the Restatement comments, the determination of 
whether a landlord is “in the business” of renting depends upon “whether the 
landlord’s rental activities are only an aspect of providing himself with housing, 
or primarily involve providing others with housing,” concluding that “in the 
latter case, the landlord is in the business of renting property.” Id. cmt. d. Thus, 
for example, the owner of a large multi-unit apartment building is “in the 
business” of renting, even if he occupies one of the units in the building. Id.  
 156. See, e.g., Bldg. Monitoring Sys., Inc. v. Paxton, 905 P.2d 1215 (Utah 
1995). 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id.  
 159. See Aweeka v. Bonds, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650, 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (“We 
can discern no rational basis for allowing such a substantive defense while 
denying an affirmative cause of action. It would be unfair and unreasonable to 
require a tenant, subjected to a retaliatory rent increase by the landlord, to wait 
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2. Coverage of Tenant Activities and Landlord Behaviors  
Another area of wide variation among jurisdictions is the scope 
of anti-retaliation doctrine, both with respect to the tenant activities 
that are protected and the types of landlord behaviors that are 
deemed to be retaliatory.160 Tenant advocates argue that in order to 
best protect and promote policies implicit within laws requiring 
safe and habitable housing for tenants, “courts should protect all 
acts that are within the tenants’ rights and intended to promote the 
habitability of rentals.”161 Similarly, supporters of tenant rights 
argue that anti-retaliation regimes must cover the full gamut of 
landlord retaliation in order to be fully effective.162 And yet, state 
laws vary significantly in terms of their scope.  
With respect to tenant activities, a majority of states have 
adopted the approach of the URLTA, which is to protect tenants 
who have either (1) reported housing code violations affecting 
health or safety; (2) complained to the landlord about the condition 
of the premises; or (3) joined or formed a tenants’ union or other 
tenants’ rights advocacy group.163 However, some legislatures 
have specifically declined to cover the tenant’s affiliation with a 
union or other advocacy organization.164 Also, some jurisdictions 
restrict protection to the tenant by requiring that the tenant’s 
complaints to the landlord or to a governmental agency be made in 
“good faith”165 or that the landlord have notice or knowledge of the 
protected activity of the tenant.166 In contrast, many states have 
added additional types of activities for which a tenant is protected, 
                                                                                                             
 
and raise the matter as a defense only, after he is confronted with an unlawful 
detainer action and a possible lien on his personal property.”).  
 160. See Richard E. Blumberg & Brian Quinn Robins, Beyond URLTA: A 
Program for Achieving Real Tenant Goals, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16 
(1976). 
 161. Brian D. Casserly, Note, Insuring the Effectiveness of Indiana’s Landlord-
Tenant Laws: The Necessity of Recognizing the Doctrine of Retaliatory Eviction in 
Indiana, 46 IND. L. REV. 1317, 1342–43 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. at 1343. Even at its broadest, the doctrine has limits. At its core, 
retaliatory eviction is much more limited than “good cause” eviction regimes 
and therefore may prohibit only vindictive or presumptively vindictive, and not 
merely capricious, eviction. See Paul Sullivan, Note, Security of Tenure for the 
Residential Tenant: An Analysis and Recommendations, 21 VT. L. REV. 1015, 
1049 (1997) (citing Blumberg & Robins, supra note 160, at 44). 
 163. See Noble-Allgire Memorandum, supra note 123, at 4. 
 164. Id. at 4–5. 
 165. “Good faith” is required by 17 states. Some states have gone further by 
allowing a landlord to recover damages from a tenant for claims made in bad 
faith. Id. at 4.  
 166. A knowledge requirement has been adopted by nine states. Id.  
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including the exercise of a right under the lease, a failure to agree 
to a new rule or regulation after the tenancy begins, or the exercise 
of a statutory right to terminate a lease.167  
Notably, although many states’ statutory protections are broad 
in coverage, judicial interpretation of these statutes can 
significantly limit their scope. Take, for example, the approach of a 
Connecticut court in interpreting a statute forbidding a landlord to 
evict within six months after the tenant “has in good faith 
requested the landlord to make repairs.”168 The court limited the 
term “repairs” to major repairs aimed at preventing urban decay 
and blight, holding that “repairs required to conform a dwelling 
unit to basic structural, mechanical[,] and housing code regulations 
are the type of repairs which were contemplated by the legislature 
and which raise the presumption of a retaliatory defense.”169 Thus, 
the court declined to recognize a request to unclog bathroom 
plumbing as a request for “repair” under the retaliatory eviction 
regime.170 The court cited a floodgate argument as its primary 
reason for interpreting the statute so narrowly.171 
State law also varies with respect to the range of landlord 
conduct that is regulated by anti-retaliation regimes. The URLTA 
prohibits retaliation in the form of eviction, increases in rent, or 
decreases in services provided to the tenant.172 Although most 
states’ retaliatory conduct laws adhere to this narrow range of 
activities, some states have expanded the list, either by adding 
other types of specific conduct or by adopting a generalized standard 
that would encompass a broader range of actions.173 Some terms 
enumerated by these more protective statutes include refusing to 
renew a lease, termination of a periodic tenancy, increased obligations 
under the lease, depriving the tenant of use of the premises, materially 
                                                                                                             
 167. Id. at 5. Some states even protect activities that are not necessarily 
related to the lease, including the pursuit of any legal action against the landlord, 
testifying against the landlord in court, or exercising rights and remedies under 
any state law. See id. at 6.  
 168. See Alteri v. Layton, 408 A.2d 18, 19 n.1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) 
(citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-20 (Westlaw 2015)). 
 169. Id. at 22. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. (“To allow the presumption to be raised by a request that a bathtub 
drain be unclogged would open the floodgates for a multitude of requests for 
repairs. In Hartford alone there exist in excess of 12,000 substandard dwelling 
units requiring repairs of both a major and minor nature. There is scarcely a 
dwelling unit in this jurisdiction beyond the pale of requiring repair. The 
necessity for repairs is applicable to nearly all existing dwelling units.”). 
 172. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101 (1972). 
 173. Noble-Allgire Memorandum, supra note 123, at 3. 
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interfering in bad faith with the tenant’s rights under the lease, or 
substantial alteration of the terms of the tenancy.174 
3. Proof of Retaliatory Motive 
A third area of variation in retaliatory eviction law concerns the 
tenant’s proof of the landlord’s retaliatory motive. It is well 
accepted that a landlord’s motive is exceptionally difficult to 
prove, and many courts and commentators have posited that 
requiring a tenant to affirmatively prove a landlord’s retaliatory 
motive renders retaliatory eviction laws nearly useless.175 A 
majority of states address the difficulty of proof through 
presumptions of retaliatory intent that favor tenants.176 According 
to this approach, when a landlord attempts to evict a tenant or 
performs other prohibited acts within a certain time period 
following protected tenant activity, a presumption of retaliation 
arises and the burden rests on the landlord to present a valid (non-
retaliatory) reason for his actions.177 Unfortunately, however, not 
all jurisdictions recognize a presumption of retaliation in favor of 
the tenant.178 Indeed, other states have gone so far as to adopt a 
presumption against the tenant and in favor of the landlord.179 
Even in states where the presumption is recognized, it is not 
without exceptions. For example, several states have adopted the 
approach of the URLTA, under which the presumption of retaliatory 
motive does not apply when a notice of a rent increase or 
diminution in services predated the tenant’s complaint.180 These 
exceptions are reasonably premised on the likelihood that a 
complaint following an unfavorable (though lawful) change in the 
lease terms may itself be unfairly motivated.181  
                                                                                                             
 174. Id. at 3–4. 
 175. See, e.g., CHESTER W. HARTMAN, HOUSING AND SOCIAL POLICY 77 
(1975) (“Motivation . . . is difficult to prove, and . . . at the end of the statutory 
period—usually three to six months—the tenant is again exposed to retaliatory 
eviction, which vitiations most of the value of the protections.”); Casserly, supra 
note 161, at 1343 (citing Gokey v. Bessette, 580 A.2d 488, 491 (Vt. 1990) (“A 
subjective test would effectively establish such a high burden of proof for 
tenants that the benefit the Legislature intended to confer would be an 
illusion.”)).  
 176.   Noble-Allgire Memorandum, supra note 123, at 6. See also Blumberg 
& Robins, supra note 160, at 16. 
 177. Noble-Allgire Memorandum, supra note 123, at 6. 
 178. Eleven states have omitted this presumption. Id. 
 179. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-509(3) (Westlaw 2015). 
 180. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101(b) (1972). 
 181. Reasonable though these exceptions may be, they have been adopted in 
only six states. See Noble-Allgire Memorandum, supra note 123, at 7. 
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The pro-tenant position favored by many states has itself been 
criticized on the basis of the time limitations that are placed on 
presumptions of retaliation. States adopting the approach of the 
uniform law limit the presumption to one year after the tenant’s 
protected conduct.182 Thus, any eviction or other regulated 
behavior by the landlord during the year following a tenant’s 
protected conduct will be presumed retaliatory, and the burden 
rests on the landlord to establish a non-retaliatory motive. 
However, most states have enacted much shorter periods, some as 
short as 90 days.183 Once the period runs out, the tenant is again 
left with the nearly insurmountable task of proving the landlord’s 
improper motive.184  
The strength of the presumption is also relevant. In some 
jurisdictions, the landlord can rebut the presumption of retaliation 
by proving that the eviction was initiated for “good cause.”185 In 
contrast, other jurisdictions provide much stronger protections by 
requiring the landlord to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the motive for eviction was not retaliatory.186 Finally, in other 
states, landlords can rely only on a predefined list of defenses to 
the tenant’s claim that retaliation has occurred.187  
Finally, there is some variation in approaches to the problem of 
a landlord’s “mixed motives”—eviction for motives that are both 
retaliatory and legitimate.188 The few jurisdictions to address this 
issue do so with one of three approaches. Some jurisdictions use a 
“sole motivation” test that requires the tenant to prove that the 
retaliatory purpose was the sole reason for the eviction.189 This test 
essentially insulates landlords with multiple motives from liability 
provided that at least one of the motives for the landlord’s conduct 
was legitimate.190 Other states apply an “independent motivation” 
test, which is far more favorable to tenants.191 Here, once the tenant 
                                                                                                             
 182. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101(b) (1972). 
 183. Noble-Allgire Memorandum, supra note 123, at 7. One state, New 
Jersey, omits any time period from its presumption. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-
10.12 (Westlaw 2015).  
 184. Even the longest presumptions of retaliation may have the effect of 
merely postponing retaliatory conduct on the part of landlords. See Blumberg & 
Robins, supra note 160, at 16. And yet, the provision of time—to plan for the 
future, garner resources, and secure alternative housing—is often benefit enough 
to a tenant faced with the possibility of immediate eviction. 
 185. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.64 (Westlaw 2015). 
 186. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 18 (Westlaw 2015). 
 187. See infra Part IV.C.5 (addressing exceptions to anti-retaliation laws). 
 188. Noble-Allgire Memorandum, supra note 123, at 10. 
 189. Iowa and Connecticut rely on this approach. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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has produced sufficient proof to raise a presumption of retaliation, 
the landlord must rebut the presumption by showing that “the 
decision to evict was reached independent of any consideration of 
the activities of the tenants protected by the statute.”192 An 
intermediate approach is the “primary motive test,” which considers 
whether a retaliatory motive was the primary or predominant reason 
for the eviction.193 
4. Remedies 
Next, anti-retaliation regimes vary in the forms of relief offered 
to tenants who successfully prove that their landlords have 
engaged in prohibited retaliatory conduct. The URLTA again is the 
touchstone for most states. The uniform law allows the tenant to 
recover “an amount not more than [three] months’ periodic rent or 
[threefold] the actual damages sustained by him, whichever is greater, 
and reasonable attorney’s fees.”194 A small number of states provide 
lesser relief, allowing recovery of actual damages and attorney’s fees 
but not the treble damages allowed under the uniform act.195 In 
contrast, two states impose penalties on landlords in addition to actual 
damages suffered.196 Understandably, tenant advocates promote anti-
retaliation regimes that afford tenants a complete range of coverage, 
including actual, consequential, and punitive damages; attorney’s 
fees and court costs; and injunctive relief.197 
5. Exceptions 
Finally, a number of states recognize exceptions to retaliatory 
conduct prohibitions, under which a landlord may evict a tenant 
notwithstanding a presumed or established retaliatory motive. Most 
                                                                                                             
 192. Silberg v. Lipscomb, 285 A.2d 86, 88 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1971). 
 193. Michigan and Virginia have adopted this approach. See Noble-Allgire 
Memorandum, supra note 123, at 10. This is also the approach endorsed by the 
Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 
14.8 (1977). 
 194. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 4.17 (1972). 
 195. Noble-Allgire Memorandum, supra note 123, at 13. 
 196. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5(f) (Westlaw 2015); TEX. PROP. CODE § 92.333 
(2014). New Hampshire’s law varies slightly in that it imposes a penalty of up to 
three months’ rent in lieu of actual damages and without the necessity of proof of 
damages. Sherryland, Inc. v. Snuffer, 837 A.2d 316, 320 (N.H. 2003). 
 197. Casserly, supra note 161, at 1342–43. Notably, a small minority of 
states have adopted rules that allow landlords to recover damages from tenants 
who make claims in bad faith. Noble-Allgire Memorandum, supra note 123, at 
14. 
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states base their lists of exceptions on the URLTA.198 Under the 
uniform law, a tenant may be evicted regardless of the landlord’s 
motive if the condition complained of was caused by the tenant, a 
member of the tenant’s family, or a person on the premises with 
the tenant’s consent; if the tenant is in default in rent; or if 
compliance with applicable codes would require alterations that 
would effectively deprive the tenant of the use of the leased 
premises.199 Of the states to adopt the URLTA’s exceptions, many 
of them have expanded upon this list with additional exceptions.200 
These may include a tenant’s breach of an obligation in the lease 
other than the obligation to pay rent or the landlord’s desire to use 
the dwelling as his own residence.201 
D. The Revised Uniform Law  
In 2012, the Uniform Law Commission undertook a large-scale 
revision of the URLTA that, as of this writing, is still underway.202 
The most current draft of the revised uniform law reflects fairly 
significant changes to the URLTA’s retaliatory eviction provisions.203 
First, the scope of tenant behavior protected by the act has been 
expanded to incorporate the variety of approaches taken by many 
states since the URLTA was first promulgated.204 Under the revised 
URLTA, a tenant would be covered not only for complaints to a 
government agency or the landlord and for affiliation with a tenants’ 
rights organization or union, but also if he exercised any legal right 
under the lease or any provision of law or pursued any legal action 
or administrative remedy against the landlord in court or an 
administrative proceeding.205 The range of landlord conduct that 
may be deemed retaliatory has also been broadened. Where the 
                                                                                                             
 198. See 5 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 43.06(a) (2d ed. 2007) 
 199. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101 (1972). 
 200. Noble-Allgire Memorandum, supra note 123, at 7. 
 201. Id. at 7–10. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & 
TENANT § 14.8 cmt. f (1977). States vary as to whether they state exceptions as 
exceptions to the doctrine entirely or exceptions to the presumption of 
retaliation. See Noble-Allgire Memorandum, supra note 123, at 7. 
 202. See Memorandum from Sheldon F. Kurtz, Chair of the Study Comm., to the 
Uniform Law Comm’n Scope and Program Comm. (May 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/
urlta_studycmtereport_051811.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3LAV-WA2C.  
 203. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 901 (Revised Nov. 
2014), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Residen 
tial%20Landlord%22and%20Tenant%20Act, archived at http://perma.cc/D48Q-
SCQ6. 
 204. Id. § 901(a). 
 205. See id. 
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original act recognized as retaliatory a suit for possession, a 
decrease in services, or an increase in rent, the revised act also 
recognizes refusing to renew a tenancy containing an option to 
renew, terminating a periodic tenancy, and any conduct prohibited 
by criminal law.206 Taken together, these reforms reflect a policy 
of protecting tenants in the exercise of any legal right, and in 
ensuring that the law contains no loopholes that would allow a 
landlord to unlawfully evict, whether literally or constructively.  
Notably, the Uniform Law Commission drafting committee has 
taken a balanced approach to reform, expanding not only tenant 
rights but also landlord protections. Again in an apparent attempt 
to incorporate the variety of state approaches to landlord 
retaliation, the Uniform Law Commission has expanded the list of 
safe harbors for landlords. The existing uniform law permits 
landlords to regain possession even after a tenant has taken 
protected action if the tenant caused the damage or code violation 
at issue, if the tenant was in rent arrears, or if compliance with the 
applicable code would require some alteration, remodeling, or 
demolition of the building that would effectively deprive the tenant 
of its use.207 The revised law would permit the landlord to evict in 
all of these cases as well as under additional circumstances. First, 
the landlord is not liable for retaliation if the tenant’s conduct was 
“in an unreasonable manner or at an unreasonable time, or was 
repeated in a manner having the effect of harassing the landlord.”208 
Second, retaliatory eviction would not apply when the tenant, a 
member of his family, or his guest engaged in conduct that 
presented a threat to the health or safety of another tenant on the 
premises209 or in criminal activity.210 Finally, the landlord could 
recover possession if he sought to do so based on a notice to 
terminate the lease and the notice was given to the tenant before 
the tenant engaged in the protected behavior.211 These reforms 
have been introduced with an eye toward preventing tenants from 
abusing anti-retaliation regimes to the detriment of landlord rights. 
Other significant reforms in the revised uniform law involve 
the presumption of retaliation. First, the Uniform Law Commission 
responded to the problem of a landlord’s “mixed motives” by 
                                                                                                             
 206. See id. § 901(b). 
 207. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101(c) (1972). 
 208. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 901(c)(2) 
(Revised Nov. 2014), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx 
?title=Residential%20Landlord%20and%20Tenant%20Act, archived at http://per 
ma.cc /D48Q-SCQ6. 
 209. See id. § 901(c)(4). 
 210. See id. § 901(c)(5). 
 211. See id. § 901(c)(6). 
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requiring the landlord’s “dominant” purpose in taking action 
against a tenant to be retaliatory.212 Here again, the Uniform Law 
Commission exhibits a moderate approach to revision by choosing 
the intermediate approach to mixed motives among the several 
fashioned by the states.213 The revised act also decreases the time 
period during which a landlord’s motive is presumed to be 
retaliatory from one year following a tenant’s protected conduct to 
six months following such action.214  
The revision of the URLTA’s retaliatory eviction provisions 
has not been without some controversy. The National Apartment 
Association (NAA), for example, has stated that it has “serious 
concerns” about the proposed revision.215 The NAA’s most 
significant concern appears to be the potential for tenants to abuse 
the law by complaining of minor defects in the premises.216 
According to the NAA, “[r]etaliation laws are often abused and 
extend the evictions process in some cities to six to 10 months as 
the parties dispute the retaliation claim in court.”217 To that end, 
the NAA has recommended that the model act protect only tenants 
who act in “good faith” and allow landlords to recover a civil 
penalty of one month’s rent plus $500, court costs, and reasonable 
attorneys’ fees from a tenant who acts in “bad faith,” such as by 
complaining of a defect or housing code violation that does not in 
fact exist.218 Tenant advocates have responded to the NAA’s 
complaints by pointing out that the organization has offered no 
                                                                                                             
 212. See id. § 902(a).  
 213. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
 214. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 903(a) (Revised 
Nov. 2014), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title= 
Residential%20Landlord%20and%20Tenant%20Act, archived at http://perma.cc 
/D48Q-SCQ6. 
 215. Letter from Douglas S. Culkin, President & CEO, Nat’l Apartment 
Ass’n, to Hon. Joan Zeldon, Chair of the Drafting Comm. to Revise the Unif. 
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (July 9, 2014) (containing National 
Apartment Association July 2014 Comments to Uniform Residential Landord 
and Tenant Act), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residen 
tial%20landlord%20and%20tenant/5_2014jul9_RURLTA_NAA%20comments 
_Culkin.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FY8U-3GXH. 
 216. Letter from Greg Brown, Senior Vice President of Government Affairs, 
Nat’l Apartment Ass’n, to Hon. Joan Zeldon, Chair of the Drafting Comm. to 
Revise the Unif. Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (July 3, 2013) (containing 
apartment industry comments to ULC update of Uniform Residential Landlord 
and Tenant Act), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Residen 
tial%20landlord%20and%20tenant/2013jul3_RURLTA_NAA_Letter_Brown.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/46ZZ-PMSE. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Letter from Douglas S. Culkin to Hon. Joan Zeldon, supra note 215, at 
2–3. 
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data to substantiate its claim that residential tenants currently abuse 
retaliatory eviction laws.219 And, to date, the Uniform Law 
Commission has not introduced specific penalties for tenants who 
act in bad faith.  
V. THE EFFICACY OF U.S. RETALIATION LAWS 
Through state-by-state experimentation, anti-retaliation regimes 
in the United States have flourished. Although a great deal of 
variation exists, most state laws provide robust protections for 
tenants who seek to hold landlords responsible for their contractual 
and legal obligations. A clear consensus has emerged among 
legislators, courts, and academics in favor of strong protections for 
tenants, with attendant safeguards for landlords in place. An 
assessment of American laws “on the books” thus speaks highly in 
favor of the adoption of anti-retaliation regimes abroad in England 
and Wales.  
However, despite the adoption of strong protections by more 
than 40 states, many tenants continue to live in fear that their 
landlords will increase rent, cut services, or even evict those who 
raise legitimate complaints and demand that landlords provide safe 
and habitable dwellings. Indeed, jurisprudential, empirical, and 
anecdotal evidence suggests that prohibitions on retaliatory conduct 
may not provide tenants with meaningful protection against landlord 
retribution. In order to determine whether anti-retaliation legislation 
would be more successful in the United Kingdom than it has been 
in the United States, it is necessary to explore the reasons why 
landlord retaliation remains a concern in this country. 
A. Empirical Data on Evictions in the United States 
1. The Scarcity of Empirical Data  
American landlord–tenant scholars have long debated the utility 
of pro-tenant reforms such as the implied warranty of habitability 
and prohibitions on retaliatory conduct. However, the functional 
                                                                                                             
 219. Letter from Lawrence McDonough to Hon. Joan Zeldon, Chair of the 
Drafting Comm. to Revise the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (Nov. 
3, 2014) (containing comments on issues to be discussed by Drafting Committee at 
November 2014 meeting), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs 
/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/2014nov3_RUTLTA_Comments_Mc 
Donough.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z8U6-LCLA. McDonough also notes 
that “[t]o the extent that tenants or landlords engage in frivolous litigation, most 
states have laws and rules that authorize the imposition of sanctions. Also, the Act 
already includes a requirement that both parties act in good faith in Section 105.” Id. 
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assessment of landlord–tenant law is extremely difficult, as little-to-
no hard evidence exists regarding the use of these doctrines in 
housing disputes. Statistical evidence on eviction proceedings is 
extremely scarce.220 Data is not collected in a systematic way at the 
national, state, or even local level.221 The data that has been 
collected has largely been in the form of small, short-term studies 
limited both in time and in locale—often to a single housing court in 
a large municipal area.222 In addition, a significant volume of the 
available “evidence” on eviction appears in the form of media—
even social media—reports rather than academic analysis.223 
 Moreover, the few published empirical studies documenting 
court proceedings between landlords and tenants do not contain 
sufficient detail to determine the frequency with which tenants rely 
upon retaliatory eviction laws or the success rates of those 
claims.224 Additionally, reported decisions in which tenants prevail 
on retaliatory eviction claims are few and far between,225 and no 
                                                                                                             
 220. See Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden 
Housing Problem, 14 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 461, 461 (2003) (“Each year, an 
untold number of Americans are evicted or otherwise forced to leave their 
homes involuntarily. The number is likely in the many millions, but we have no 
way of gauging even a modestly precise figure for renters, because such data are 
simply not collected on a national basis or in any systematic way in most 
localities where evictions take place.” (internal citations omitted)); Desmond, 
supra note 1, at 90 (“Eviction is perhaps the most understudied process affecting 
the lives of the urban poor.”). 
 221. See Hartman & Robinson, supra note 220, at 461. 
 222. See, e.g., BOS. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, 
THE IMPORTANCE OF REPRESENTATION IN EVICTION CASES AND HOMELESSNESS 
PREVENTION: A REPORT ON THE BBA CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL HOUSING PILOTS 
(2012) (Lawrence, MA and Lynn, MA); LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., 
NO TIME FOR JUSTICE: A STUDY OF CHICAGO’S EVICTION COURT (2003). 
 223. See, e.g., Leslie Wolf Branscomb & Tanya Sierra, Landlord of 
Opportunity: National City Mayor’s Units Have Made Him Millions While 
Tenants Fight Vermin, Disrepair, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 15, 2005, at A1; 
Jake Thomas, The Reality of Retaliatory Eviction, Part I, SMILE POLITELY (June 
10, 2008, 11:00 AM), http://www.smilepolitely.com/culture/The_Reality_of_Re 
taliatory_Eviction_Part_1/, archived at http://perma.cc/P2PG-2AXZ [hereinafter 
Thomas, Part I] (“In downstate Illinois, a law aimed at protecting tenants from 
landlords who might retaliate against them for calling in a building inspector is 
almost never used.”); Jake Thomas, The Reality of Retaliatory Eviction, Part II, 
SMILE POLITELY (June 18, 2008, 10:59 AM), http://www.smilepolitely.com 
/culture/The_Reality_of_Retaliatory_Eviction_Part_2/, archived at http://perma.cc 
/P84Q-MBZH [hereinafter Thomas, Part II]. 
 224. Of the numerous eviction and housing court studies reviewed by the 
author of this Article and cited herein, most did not contain any discussion of 
retaliatory eviction or any statistics regarding the use of anti-retaliation laws.  
 225. A Westlaw search for the term “retaliatory eviction” reveals approximately 
1,000 cases reported in the 47 years since the landmark decision of Edwards v. 
Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), slightly more than 20 per year 
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reliable record exists of the number of claims raised at the trial 
level. Also, because many evictions occur informally, either 
through landlord self-help or agreements entered into between 
landlords and tenants, it is difficult to know with certainty whether 
retaliatory eviction laws are, in practice, useful to residential 
tenants.226 
2. What the Data Show 
Although compelling arguments may be made that anti-
retaliation laws ought to be stronger, at least in some jurisdictions,227 
the available data concerning eviction proceedings suggests that 
reform of anti-retaliation laws will have little practical effect on 
tenants. This is because both statistical and anecdotal reports suggest 
that tenants lose nearly all eviction cases, whether or not landlord 
retaliation is involved.228 In fact, reports that tenants “always” lose 
eviction cases, or lose in 95% to 99% of cases, are not unusual.  
More to the point, both statistical data and anecdotal evidence 
suggest that the availability of a legal defense to eviction—such as 
landlord retaliation—does not significantly affect eviction 
outcomes.229 Indeed, even in jurisdictions where anti-retaliation 
regimes strongly favor tenants, tenants very rarely invoke these laws, 
                                                                                                             
 
nationwide. The number of cases in which a tenant’s retaliatory eviction claim 
was actually considered by the court is far smaller, as are those involving 
successful claims.  
 226. Desmond supra note 1, at 95 (providing an anecdotal account of a 
landlord who paid tenants $200 each to leave instead of taking them to eviction 
court, and who estimated that he initiated 10 such informal evictions for every 
formal eviction proceeding that he filed). 
 227. See supra Part IV.C (discussing state-by-state and local variation on 
anti-retaliation regimes). Some commentators have argued for doctrinal reforms 
to strengthen anti-retaliation law. See, e.g., Lindsey, supra note 126.  
 228. See, e.g., Branscomb & Sierra, supra note 223, at A1 (95% of pro se 
tenants lose their cases); LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., supra note 222, 
at 17 (observing that Chicago tenants “always lost on the merits”); CAL. 
APARTMENT LAW INFO. FOUND., UNLAWFUL DETAINER STUDY 1991, at 26, 38 
(finding that landlords prevail in over 99% of cases). 
 229. See LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., supra note 222, at 16–18 
(concluding that “[i]n all cases in which a defense was raised, the tenant lost”); 
Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor 
Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 558 (1992) (“The[] 
formal availability [of defenses], however, appears to have little effect on case 
outcomes.”); see also Lynn E. Cunningham, Legal Needs for Low-Income 
Population in Washington, DC, 5 UNIV. D.C. L. REV. 21, 37 (2000) (noting that 
although the District of Columbia has some of the strongest tenant protections of 
any jurisdiction in the country, tenants are still disadvantaged). 
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whether formally or informally.230 Thus, the strength or weaknesses 
of the retaliatory eviction laws in a particular jurisdiction may be 
largely, if not entirely, irrelevant in most evictions that occur there.  
Additionally, despite the existence of laws specifically prohibiting 
retaliation, at least some landlords continue to evict in retaliation for 
protected tenant behavior.231 While it might be expected that some 
small percentage of unscrupulous landlords will continue to act in 
flagrant violation of the law, surveys of tenant concerns indicate that 
the practice may not be limited to a small subset of cases. Multiple 
sources report that tenants continue to express concerns that if they 
take any legal action against their landlords, they will be faced 
with eviction, rent increases, or other forms of harassment.232  
B. The Institutional Context of Anti-Retaliation Laws 
As the above data suggests, evaluating the success of anti-
retaliation regimes is complex. Tenants lose eviction cases so 
quickly and at such high rates not because of the strength or 
weakness of retaliatory eviction laws or other tenant defenses, but 
because of broader and more pervasive institutional and structural 
barriers to tenant success in housing courts. These contextual 
influences must be factored in to any comparative assessment 
predicting the success of retaliatory eviction abroad. An evaluation 
of the full range of legal, financial, and social forces affecting 
residential tenants in the United States is far beyond the purview of 
this project. However, four contextual variables account for much 
of the reason why tenants rarely avail themselves of defenses to 
eviction with any success. 
                                                                                                             
 230. See Thomas, Part I, supra note 223 (“In downstate Illinois, a law aimed 
at protecting tenants from landlords who might retaliate against them for calling 
in a building inspector is almost never used.”). In fact, some evidence suggests 
that tenants rarely invoke defenses of any kind in eviction suits. LAWYERS’ 
COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., supra note 222, at 16 (noting that defenses were 
raised in only 30% of cases). 
 231. See Desmond, supra note 1, at 115–16 (describing an action of eviction 
in retaliation for the tenant’s call to the Department of Neighborhood Services to 
report code violations in Milwaukee, where retaliatory eviction is forbidden by 
law). 
 232. See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 229, at 563 & n.106; Lindsey, supra note 
126, at 106–07 (relying on news reports of retaliatory eviction to argue that 
retaliatory conduct by landlords is a significant problem “[d]espite the lack of 
definite statistics” on its frequency). 
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1. Legal Representation 
First, tenants in the United States very rarely have legal 
representation at summary eviction proceedings. In fact, some 
studies show that tenants appear pro se in as many as 95% to 99% 
of cases.233 While the data varies from report to report, studies 
consistently report that landlords have representation in a majority 
of cases, while tenants do not.234 The disparity of representation in 
landlord–tenant disputes has become accepted as fact. One expert 
recently reported that “[i]n landlord-tenant matters . . . it is typical 
for ninety percent of tenants to appear pro se while ninety percent of 
landlords appear with counsel.”235 Some evidence suggests that the 
disparity in representation is far less pronounced in cases involving 
“mom and pop” landlords236 as opposed to professionals.237 Even 
still, in cases where neither side is represented by counsel, landlords 
tend to receive assistance from agents and other “repeat players” in 
housing court, whereas tenants are more frequently represented by 
novices—family members and friends.238 Thus, whereas landlords 
generally receive at least some modicum of professional help in 
court, tenants rarely do.  
                                                                                                             
 233. LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., supra note 222, at 13 (tenants 
were represented in 5.3% of cases); Cunningham, supra note 229 (less than 1% 
of cases involved an attorney representing a client). 
 234. See, e.g., Desmond, supra note 1, at 123 (citing SEEDCO POLICY CTR., 
HOUSING HELP PROGRAM, SOUTH BRONX, NYC (2009)) (estimating that tenants 
were unrepresented in over 70% of cases); REBECCA HALL, BERKELEY CMTY. 
LAW CTR., EVICTION PREVENTION AS HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION 9–11 (1991) 
(landlords were represented in over 80% of eviction cases, whereas tenants were 
represented in only 20% of evictions); LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., 
supra note 222, at 13–14 (53% of landlords represented, compared to 5.3% of 
tenants); COMM. TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVS., FINAL 
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1989), in 19 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 775, 773 (1989) (landlords were represented in 80% to 90% of 
cases while tenants were represented in no more than 10% to 15%); CITYWIDE 
TASK FORCE ON HOUS. COURT, 5 MINUTE JUSTICE: “AIN’T NOTHING GOING ON 
BUT THE RENT!”, A REPORT OF THE MONITORING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 
CITYWIDE TASKFORCE ON HOUSING COURT §§ 4.2–.3 (1986) (21% of tenants 
were represented compared to 78% of landlords); CMTY. TRAINING & RES CTR. 
& CITY-WIDE TASK FORCE ON HOUS. COURT, INC., HOUSING COURT, 
EVICTIONS, AND HOMELESSNESS: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ESTABLISHING A 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL (1993) (tenants represented in 12% of cases compared to 
98% of landlords).  
 235. Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 
47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 750 (2015). 
 236. Bezdek, supra note 229, at 556–57.  
 237. See CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAU, EVICTIONS RISE IN THE BRONX BUT 
DECLINE IN OTHER BOROUGHS BETWEEN 1997 AND 1999, at 7 ( 2001). 
 238. Bezdek, supra note 229, at 562.  
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With respect to eviction outcomes, representation appears to 
matter. A recent review of the available literature suggests that 
tenants prevail twice to ten times as often when assisted by an 
attorney.239 One study of evictions in California found that 
represented tenants won twice as frequently as landlords, whereas 
landlords won five times more often than unrepresented tenants.240 
Another study of a New York housing court found that evictions 
occurred in over half of the cases in which tenants were 
unrepresented, but only one third of the cases in which tenants 
were assisted by counsel.241  
Several explanations may be offered as to why tenants win more 
frequently with legal counsel. Litigants who proceed pro se are 
forced to navigate complex schemes of substantive and procedural 
rules.242 The preparation of pleadings, the conduction of discovery, 
and even proper court decorum are entirely foreign to untrained 
litigants and can present substantial roadblocks to success.243 In 
                                                                                                             
 239. Steinberg, supra note 235, at 757. 
 240. HALL, supra note 234, at 11. 
 241. Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor 
Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 
35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 419, 427 (2001) (judgments issued in 32% of cases where 
tenants were represented, compared to 52% of cases where tenants were not 
represented). 
 The data is not entirely consistent on this point. Some studies have not 
concluded that representation improves tenant outcomes. For example, a 2004 
Chicago study found that although represented tenants were more successful in 
obtaining continuances, their cases resulted in judgments for eviction just as 
frequently as those involving unrepresented tenants. LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR 
BETTER HOUS., supra note 222, at 17–18. However, it must be remembered that 
it is difficult to assess the effect of attorney representation on tenant outcomes, as 
most cases in which the tenant is represented are resolved pursuant to agreed 
orders, the terms of which cannot be adequately monitored to produce reliable 
data. See id. at 10; Randy G. Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way Out: Making the 
Summary Eviction Process a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord 
Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759, 794–95 (1994). Gerchick also notes another 
reason why represented tenants tend to win more often: “tenant attorneys may not 
take cases that they do not believe that they can win, except in the unusual case in 
which the tenant will be able to pay the attorney’s legal fees out of his own pocket 
rather than relying upon the court to award fees.” Gerchick, supra, at 795.  
 Finally, a growing body of new research is forming outcomes measures for 
“limited” or “unbundled” legal services, or the provision of basic legal information 
or services from an attorney at the outset of litigation rather than full service 
representation. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 235 (finding that tenant outcomes 
were not improved by unbundled representation); BOS. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE, 
supra note 222, at 32 (concluding that full representation of tenants by counsel 
is essential for the protection of their rights); see also Steinberg, supra note 235, 
at 745 (collecting other research in this area). 
 242. Steinberg, supra note 235, at 755. 
 243. Id. 
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eviction cases, lawyers can determine what is actually owed by way 
of rent, negotiate with landlords for more time to pay, and, when 
necessary, assist the tenant in articulating legitimate defenses to the 
landlord’s eviction claim.244 In particular, a lawyer’s ability to 
provide a tenant with knowledge regarding viable defenses and the 
confidence to assert those defenses is crucial to the success of anti-
retaliation regimes. As plainly articulated by one commentator, 
“[t]he ability to utilize a rebuttable presumption [of retaliation] is 
unhelpful where the tenant is unable to state any valid defense 
because of a lack of legal training.”245 
2. Housing Courts 
Housing courts themselves face many challenges that tend to 
impede tenant outcomes. First is the “astounding brevity of eviction 
proceedings” in many housing courts around the country.246 
Eviction cases are often decided in a “matter of minutes” and 
hearings leave little time for a tenant to assert defenses to the 
landlord’s complaint.247 A 2003 study of Chicago evictions found 
that the average hearing lasted a mere 1 minute and 44 seconds: 
“barely enough time for the parties to reach the bench, identify 
themselves, and state the nature of the dispute.”248 A study of 
Baltimore evictions of the same year found that the average case 
received “less than 30 seconds of judicial review.”249 Notably, the 
length of hearings appears to vary significantly with legal 
representation. One study found that the average length of a hearing 
increased when the tenant was represented but decreased below the 
average when the landlord alone had the benefit of counsel.250  
The short time devoted to eviction proceedings is a 
consequence of a larger systemic problem within housing courts—
a general lack of resources. Most housing courts are severely 
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underfunded and understaffed. In Baltimore, for example, where 
over 150,000 eviction suits are filed annually, the state district 
court assigns only one judge per day to rent court.251 Baltimore 
researchers thus surmise that “[t]here are arguably fewer judicial 
resources and less due process devoted to these cases than any 
other matters in the court system.”252 The haste of eviction 
proceedings undoubtedly results in high numbers of procedural 
defects.253 When so little time and attention are paid to tenant 
claims that even basic due process is lacking, the availability of 
tenant defenses like retaliatory eviction cannot be expected to have 
any meaningful effect on outcomes. 
 Because most suits for eviction are filed in response to a 
tenant’s failure to pay rent, the likelihood that procedural defects 
affect tenant outcomes is arguably low.254 However, even if the 
lack of time and attention devoted to proceedings by eviction 
courts does not always affect outcomes, it comes at an expressive 
cost. Indifference sends a message to tenants that contesting the 
claim is futile. To tenants, judges seem impatient and biased 
toward landlords.255 The appearance of landlord preference has 
meaningful philosophical effects, to be sure. As one group of 
researchers cautioned, “[a]n illegitimate process that comes with 
the imprimatur of the state may ultimately inflict more dignitary 
harm than landlord self-help.”256 More practically speaking, a 
tenant is not likely to raise a defense to eviction if she feels that 
doing so would be fruitless. 
Lamentably, the problem of bias is not merely a problem of 
perception. Many housing court judges exhibit a clear bias toward 
landlords. For example, in one study only 60% of cases were 
dismissed when the landlord failed to appear despite clear legal 
rules requiring dismissal for want of prosecution in such cases.257 
In that same study, landlords were often not required to 
specifically establish the elements of a prima facie case; instead, 
judges seemed to presume that they had been met.258 Researchers 
also observed that “important court procedures” were frequently 
omitted in eviction proceedings: the parties were sworn to tell the 
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truth only 8% of the time, and judges examined the eviction notice 
presented to the tenant in only 65% of cases.259  
Some evidence suggests that this type of judicial bias exists in 
other jurisdictions as well. The bad behavior of one Indiana judge 
was recently highlighted when the state supreme court overruled 
an eviction order on due process grounds in Morton v. Ivacic. In 
that case, the small claims court refused to allow the tenant to 
present testimonial or documentary evidence in his favor, 
remarking: “Ultimately, [the landlord’s] going to get possession of 
the property. . . . [S]ir, where there’s smoke there’s fire . . . I mean 
he isn’t making this up. He’s a substantial citizen. Evidently, you 
owe him something.”260 Though the state supreme court’s rebuke 
of the trial court judge may be gratifying for tenant advocates, it 
does little for the untold numbers of tenants who face similar 
treatment and lack the knowledge and resources to lodge an 
appeal. 
Finally, judicial behavior can have profound effects on the 
tenant’s ability to articulate a defense to eviction. One study 
determined that tenants raised defenses in only 9% of cases when they 
were not prompted by a judge to do so, compared to 55% of the time 
when the judge asked the tenant for a defense.261 Disappointingly, 
that same study observed that judges asked tenants if they had a 
defense in only 27% of cases, although they were “solicitous in 
helping landlords establish their prima facie cases.”262 This data, if 
generalizable to the experience of tenants in other housing courts, has 
profound implications for the success of anti-retaliation regimes. 
3. Reporting of Evictions 
Market forces may also undermine the success of anti-
retaliation regimes. In recent years, numerous reporting services 
have surfaced that offer to provide background information about 
potential tenants to prospective landlords. Understandably, most 
landlords do not wish to rent to a tenant with a record of a past 
eviction.263 In many cases, even a dismissed eviction is a black 
mark that will impede a tenant’s ability to rent in the future.264 
Thus, tenants with histories of eviction have difficulty finding 
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desirable housing.265 Recently evicted tenants also have problems 
qualifying for affordable housing programs.266 It is not surprising 
that a tenant would therefore endure poor living conditions without 
complaint in order to avoid the possibility of an eviction filing, 
even one that is not legally justified and might ultimately be 
dismissed. 
Additionally, prohibitions on retaliatory conduct do nothing to 
protect tenants who have asserted their rights against past 
landlords from being blacklisted from future rentals.267 This 
difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that credit bureaus and renter 
screening companies routinely review court records to identify 
filings. By law, the tenant has the right to have the court record 
show that the judgment has been satisfied.268 In practice, however, 
this almost never occurs.269 As a result, the tenant is left with the 
burden of attempting to explain an incomplete court record to 
subsequent landlords and lenders.270 
4. Financial and Informational Concerns 
Finally, financial and informational obstacles significantly affect 
the success of anti-retaliation regimes. For many tenants, the 
inability to pay rent is the largest impediment to a valid defense. 
Anti-retaliation regimes generally do not protect tenants who are in 
arrears with respect to rent payments.271 Since most eviction actions 
involve the tenant’s failure to pay rent, it is hardly surprising that 
defenses to eviction, including retaliatory eviction, are rarely 
successfully invoked.272  
Even where tenants can afford to pay rent on time, the high 
cost of legal counsel and court proceedings may deter many 
tenants from bringing affirmative retaliatory eviction claims or 
from appearing to defend an eviction suit in housing court. 
Although some jurisdictions have successfully implemented low-
cost procedures for adjudicating landlord–tenant claims, court 
costs in many jurisdictions are unreasonably high for most 
                                                                                                             
 265. Id. at 119. 
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 267. Vicki Richman, Landlords Blacklist Activist Tenants, SHELTERFORCE 
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tenants.273 The cost of an attorney is also prohibitive for most 
tenants. Legal advocates for the poor have long argued for a legal 
right to counsel in housing courts, similar to the right that exists in 
criminal cases, on grounds that it would ensure due process of law 
and procedural safeguards in an area of vital interest for tenants 
and their families.274 Unfortunately, those pleas have failed to 
produce any constitutionally or statutorily guaranteed rights to 
counsel in housing cases. Thus, tenants who cannot afford counsel 
on their own must rely on either federally funded legal aid or local 
pro bono services providers. However, federally funded legal aid 
serves only the very poor, and even then it is severely underfunded 
and understaffed.275 According to the most recent data, there is 
only one Legal Aid lawyer for every 6,415 eligible individuals.276  
Further impeding tenants’ success in housing court is the fact 
that housing law in the United States is notoriously complex.277 
Private landlord–tenant regimes vary not only by state but also by 
municipality. The law applicable to a tenant’s case may be in the 
form of state statutes, local administrative rules, and the 
corresponding case law. Those tenants who are most likely to have 
meritorious retaliatory eviction claims are likely to be 
unsophisticated, even illiterate.278 It is unsurprising then that 
researchers studying eviction routinely observe that tenants are 
poorly informed about their rights as tenants, the mechanics of 
eviction, and the means of defending an eviction proceeding.279  
                                                                                                             
 273. For example, the filing fee in a summary eviction in Baltimore, 
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Although some community centers and legal services 
organizations provide basic information to tenants about eviction 
proceedings, the availability and quality of assistance varies widely 
by locale.280 Some communities have highly visible and reputable 
services that assist tenants in their dealings with landlords.281 
However, in other communities, these services are either less reliable 
or non-existent.282 And, in all cases, only those organizations made up 
of legal professionals can offer meaningful legal advice to the public, 
as non-lawyers are generally prohibited by law from providing legal 
services.283 Without even a basic understanding of their legal rights or 
the mechanisms for enforcing them, tenants have little chance of 
successfully invoking anti-retaliation laws, even when a landlord’s 
conduct is egregious. 
VI. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM  
The foregoing assessment demonstrates that although anti-
retaliation regimes in the United States are generally robust, offering 
stringent protections for tenants against retributive landlords, they 
are largely underutilized by tenants who lack the institutional 
resources to marshal effective defenses against eviction in housing 
court. Thus, the success of these regimes in the United States is 
mixed. Doctrinally and philosophically, anti-retaliation regimes are 
uncontroversial, even favored. Practically, however, they have had 
limited effects on the lives of tenants. It follows then that the 
lessons to be drawn for law reform in the United Kingdom are of 
two types: doctrinal and contextual. With respect to doctrine, a 
review of American law reveals the prohibitions introduced in the 
English and Welsh proposals are modest, even conservative, in 
comparison. And, with respect to context, a review of the legal and 
non-legal institutions for tenant support in the United Kingdom 
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suggests that anti-retaliation law will thrive in a manner not 
currently possible in the United States. 
A. Doctrine 
In comparison to American law, the proposed approach to 
landlord retaliation in the English House of Commons is relatively 
modest. First, whereas most American jurisdictions permit tenants 
to bring an affirmative claim for damages or injunctive relief 
against landlords who act in a retaliatory fashion, both the English 
and Welsh legislation provide only a defense to an action for 
possession.284 Indeed, the proposed laws provide no remedies at all 
to the tenant other than the invalidity of a notice to quit.285 Although 
tenants in the United States may enjoy attorney fees and damages, 
often expressed as a multiplier of monthly rent, victorious tenants in 
England and Wales would be awarded no more than ongoing 
possession of the property in question.  
Additionally, the scope of the proposed legislation is exceptionally 
narrow compared to the variation in the United States. Regimes in the 
United States tend to prohibit retaliation in many forms, including not 
only eviction, but also increases in rent and decreases in services.286 
State consensus, expressed most recently through the revised 
URLTA, would also penalize landlords for refusing to renew a fixed 
term tenancy or terminating a periodic tenancy with a retaliatory 
motive.287 In contrast, proposed law in the United Kingdom seeks to 
combat a narrow subset of landlord behavior—termination of a 
periodic tenancy through notice.288 Other landlord behaviors simply 
are not addressed. The range of tenant behavior that would be 
protected under the proposed law in England and Wales is also far 
more limited than that of most regimes in the United States. The 
proposed law speaks only to a tenant making complaints regarding 
the condition of the premises and not to other types of conduct 
such as the pursuit of other legal claims against the landlord 
unrelated to the tenancy. 289 
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One noteworthy feature of the English House of Commons 
proposal is that it does not require any proof by the tenant that the 
landlord had a retaliatory motive in serving the tenant with notice to 
vacate.290 The mere service of a notice to vacate within six months 
after a tenant has made a valid complaint to the landlord or a local 
housing authority regarding the condition of the premises is deemed 
“invalid.”291 This formulation wisely avoids the requirement of 
affirmative proof of the landlord’s retaliatory motive. In the United 
States, it is agreed nearly universally that a presumption of 
retaliatory motive is essential to the success of a retaliatory eviction 
regime.292 Without the presumption, it would be almost impossible 
for a tenant to prove the subjective mindset of the landlord in his or 
her decision to evict.293 The requirement of affirmative proof 
would thus undermine the regime entirely.  
Indeed, the English and Welsh proposals are more narrow and 
landlord-friendly than American law in almost every respect 
except one: the exceptions to its application. To be sure, the 
proposed law in England would not apply where the complained-of 
condition was caused by the tenant’s own fault.294 Further, English 
law would not apply to those cases in which the landlord sought to 
place the dwelling on the market for sale.295 However, no express 
exception is named in either the English or Welsh provisions for cases 
in which the tenant is in arrears in the payment of rent.296 This 
exception is nearly universal in the United States, and understandably 
so. American landlords would stridently protest any law foreclosing 
their inability to terminate a lease on the ground of nonpayment. The 
introduction of a similar exception to the proposals in England and 
Wales may provide the necessary assurance to landlords that their 
basic right to the payment of rent will not be affected by this 
protective measure. In addition, in some American jurisdictions, 
tenants are not afforded the benefit of a presumption of retaliation 
when a tenant complains of housing conditions only after receiving 
a notice of rent increase or diminution in services.297 These 
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exceptions are designed to combat the possibility that a tenant’s 
complaint is itself retaliatory in nature.298 The introduction of a 
similar limitation in the proposed legislation may alleviate some of 
the concerns of the RLA, which has expressed a rational fear that 
tenants will abuse the system.  
B. Context  
On its face, the anti-retaliation legislation currently pending in 
the United Kingdom appears promising. In comparison to the 
complexity and variation of American law, its formulation is simple 
and its ambitions are few. However, questions remain regarding 
whether the law, if enacted, would be effective. In the United States, 
where landlord protections are often far more robust than those 
proposed in the United Kingdom, landlord retaliation remains a 
substantial threat. Would retaliatory eviction laws similarly 
founder abroad?  
In the United Kingdom, a robust system of both legal and non-
legal institutions provide tenants with access both to information 
about the law and to legal services. Perhaps most obviously 
significant is that legal aid is available to much of the population 
through a so-called “Judicare system.”299 Persons eligible for aid 
receive government vouchers that permit litigants to procure legal 
assistance from the private bar.300 Importantly, for most of the 
system’s history, the range of persons eligible for aid has not been 
limited to the very poor but has included a majority of the 
population, even the middle class.301 In contrast, legal aid in the 
United States is far less accessible. No right to counsel is 
recognized in civil cases such as landlord–tenant disputes, and 
therefore tenants in need of legal support must rely on pro bono 
organizations for aid.302 And, although the availability of legal aid 
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and legal services is uniform across the United Kingdom, 
assistance in the United States varies significantly by geography.303  
In addition, unlike the United States, the United Kingdom has 
numerous non-legal institutions to which tenants may turn for 
assistance in their interactions with landlords.304 Some of these are 
government-sponsored, such as regulatory agencies and government 
ombudsmen.305 The Housing Ombudsman, for example, can deal 
with some, though not all, disputes between tenants and private 
landlords.306 Moreover, residents of the United Kingdom enjoy 
access to a set of reputable advice providers, including the Citizens 
Advice Bureau, Shelter, the Law Centres Network,307 and 
AdviceNow.308 Shelter, for example, provides a wealth of 
information on tenancy agreements, the rights and obligations of 
landlords and tenants, and basic advice regarding landlord–tenant 
disputes directly on their website.309 In addition, Shelter claims 
that its advisors are available 365 days a year to provide advice to 
tenants in person, over the telephone, or online.310 Similarly, 
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Citizens Advice Bureau assists tenants with housing disputes either 
in person at over 3,000 local venues or remotely, by telephone or 
over the Internet.311 These organizations are highly visible to the 
public, in part because official government websites concerning 
housing and legal aid both inform readers about the existence of 
these organizations and provide direct links to their websites.312 
The availability of these services and their prominence both on the 
Internet generally and on easy-to-navigate government websites 
stands in stark contrast to the United States.  
Finally, the key strength of advice organizations in the United 
Kingdom is that they have the power to dispense legal advice, 
much as a legal professional would do, but at little to no cost to the 
tenant.313 In the United States, on the other hand, stringent 
prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law prevent non-
lawyers from dispensing legal advice.314 Thus, the average tenant 
in the United Kingdom is equipped in ways that American tenants 
are not—with funding, information, and support.315  
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the United States, the law has long disfavored retaliation by 
landlords against residential tenants who assert their rights to safe 
and habitable housing.316 Most states prohibit landlords from 
taking revenge against tenants either through targeted legislation or 
case law.317 The primary purpose of these statutes and rulings is to 
provide tenants with the freedom and confidence to insist that 
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 316. See 5 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 43.06(a) (2d ed. 2007).  
 317. Id. § 43.06(a).  
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landlords provide housing of the quality that is required by law.318 On 
paper, the protections guaranteed to tenants by most retaliatory 
eviction regimes are quite robust.319 In many states, a tenant who 
complains of indecent housing—whether to a landlord, to government 
authorities, or by way of community action—is protected against 
eviction, increases in rent, and other unfavorable lease modifications. 
Regrettably, however, the practical success of most retaliatory 
eviction regimes in the United States is highly questionable. Reported 
cases in which tenants prevail on retaliatory eviction claims are 
scarce, as are statistical data on the successful use of the defense in 
housing and small claims courts. Additionally, although little 
statistical evidence exists on the incidence of retaliatory action by 
landlords, the available evidence suggests that retaliatory eviction 
laws do little to improve the position of residential tenants in 
eviction suits. Despite the existence of anti-retaliation laws “on the 
books,” many tenants in the United States continue to endure 
substandard living conditions without complaint out of fear of 
retaliation. 
However, the failure of United States anti-retaliation regimes 
should not discourage legal reformers in the United Kingdom. The 
approaches to retaliatory eviction laws in the United States are many 
and varied, as individual states experiment with the appropriate 
balance between landlord freedom and tenant protection. Although 
political and academic debates exist at the margins, widespread 
agreement exists on the necessity of these regimes. Moreover, 
although tenants continue to face landlord retribution, structural and 
contextual barriers to tenant success are likely to blame, rather than 
doctrinal shortcomings. In the United States, the primary impediment 
to tenant success in evictions is a lack of institutional support. 
Without adequate representation or even access to information, 
American tenants are constrained from asserting viable defenses to 
eviction suits. In the United Kingdom, where legal and non-legal 
institutions of tenant-aid abound, prohibitions on landlord revenge are 
much more likely to survive, and thrive. 
                                                                                                             
 318. See Lindsey, supra note 126, at 110–11. Lindsey notes that anti-
retaliation laws promote multiple state policies, including: “(1) improving public 
health, housing, and living conditions; (2) promoting social stability; and (3) 
reducing the cost of eviction to governments.” Id. at 110–13. 
 319. See Lawrence R. McDonough, Still Crazy After All These Years: Landlords 
and Tenants and the Law of Torts, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 427, 429 (2006) 
(citing Minnesota’s anti-retaliation laws to support the proposition that “the law 
clearly favors tenants”). 

